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Part 1: Introduction 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
“Whatever we call these operations, peace enforcement or 
peacekeeping, they will require a civilian component and a civilian-
military interface. That’s been the case in all of these operations in the 
past and most certainly in Bosnia, and it will be one of the key lessons 
learned for the future”  
Carl Bildt, The High Representative, Bosnia-Herzegovina (May 1996).  
 
1.1 Theme 
 
”Peacekeeping is no longer what it used to be”, states Espen Barth Eide (2001:1), and 
continues to point out that peacekeeping has become “…a more complex, comprehensive 
and dangerous activity.” Just as peacekeeping is transforming both in terms of execution 
and conceptually, so is civil-military cooperation. The development of traditional 
peacekeeping into multidimensional third-generation peacekeeping has caused a blurring 
of the traditional division of roles and labour between the military and civilian 
components. The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia launched in 
December 1995 was the Alliance’s first military engagement on land and contributed 
greatly, according to Barth Eide (2001:3), to reshaping its identity. In the early phases of 
IFOR the focus was to avoid undertaking what was perceived to be civilian tasks. 
Increasingly however, the understanding of a military mandate expanded, and this 
realization helped forge closer ties between the peacekeeping force and its civilian 
counterparts (ibid). The following operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have 
further strengthened these ties, but also exposed areas of contention between the military 
and civilian components. Yet the realization seems to be that no component can succeed 
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in isolation. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is a military tool developed by NATO to 
facilitate coordination and cooperation between the NATO commander and the civilian 
agencies and players in the operational theatre.  
 
1.2 Background for the research question 
 
The new security-political landscape which arose subsequent to the end of the Cold War 
has brought with it paradigmatic changes to peacekeeping and civil-military cooperation. 
Conceptual development and confusion have been intertwined with divergent approaches 
to the mission by contributing nations in multinational military operations. In this section 
I will elaborate more on this to set the stage for my research question.  
 
1.2.1 The generations of peacekeeping 
 
The history of peacekeeping may be presented as different generations of peacekeeping. 
The first generation of peacekeeping occurred after the end of the Second World War. 
First generation peacekeeping may also be labelled traditional peacekeeping, defined as: 
 
 “A traditional peacekeeping operation is composed of lightly armed military personnel deployed in a 
conflict area under a mandate of the UN Security Council, and with the consent of the parties to the 
conflict. The peacekeeping force is to be impartial to the conflicting parties and base its activities on the 
principle of minimum use of force (self-protection)” (in Nissen, 2002:7).  
  
First generation peacekeeping was involved in interstate conflicts, where the parties gave 
their consent to the deployment. The UN forces were perceived as impartial and could 
only use military force in self-defence.  
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Second generation peacekeeping occurred after the fall of the “Iron Curtain”. Now 
peacekeeping efforts were required in intrastate conflicts, altering the premises for the 
deployments. Second generation peacekeeping has also been labelled  
Peace Support Operations (PSO). NATO applies the following definition of PSOs: 
 
“PSOs are multi-functional operations, conducted impartially, normally in support of an 
internationally recognised organisation such as the UN or Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian 
agencies. PSOs are designed to achieve a longer term political settlement or other specified 
conditions. They include Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement as well as conflict prevention, 
peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian relief” (AJP-3.4.1 Chapter 2, article 0202). 
 
According to the preface of the NATO doctrine on PSOs, AJP-3.4.1 (2001), there are two 
types of NATO military operations, Article 51 Collective Defence Operations and non-
Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CRO). The preface further states that PSOs are 
continually developing within the context of CRO. CROs are given a high profile in the 
Strategic Concept developed by NATO in 1999 (Frantzen 2005:70). CROs are a more 
comprehensive framework for military operations. In this thesis I will employ the term 
Peace Support Operation (PSO). The definition provides a hint as to the selection of 
concepts developed to describe international military operations. Second generation 
peacekeeping operations were more complex than first generation peacekeeping, and 
adjusted to the new security landscape as it took form after 1989. The peacekeeping 
operations of the 1990s were multidisciplinary, with a great number of different players 
present in the theatre. Reaching consensus was often impeded by anarchy and the lack of 
state structures. The military became more heavily equipped, and its mandate extended. 
Examples of second generation peacekeeping operations are the UN Protection Force in 
the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), and the UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) 
(Dybwad 1999:7).  
                                                 
1 This article states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be 
considered as an attack against all 
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The peacekeeping operations of today have evolved into a third generation of 
peacekeeping. According to Dybwad (1999:7), third generation peacekeeping is 
characterized by long-term peace- and nation building efforts, and an expanded regional 
responsibility. Civil-military cooperation has entered the scene as a crucial tool in dealing 
with the great number of players. The new peacekeeping has a substantial non-military 
mandate and composition in addition to its military component. The objective is to 
consolidate state structures by means of a repertoire of tasks conducted by a wide range of 
players. Examples of third generation peacekeeping operations are the Implementation 
Force (IFOR) and the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in the former Yugoslavia.  
 
1.2.2 Different national approaches to Peace Support Operations 
 
The myriad of concepts attempting to capture the activities, purposes and nature of PSOs 
are confronted with a multinational reality in which the mission is interpreted and solved 
differently by various national militaries. Nissen (2002:72) observes that although all 
nations in KFOR operated under the same mandate and regulations, a wide variety of 
interpretations were apparent in practice. Seemingly each nation ultimately prioritised 
national standards. The statement “Germans and Americans are dressed like knights from 
the Middle Ages”2 made by a Norwegian officer illustrates how the differences may be 
perceived.  
 
Based on two recent articles in The New York Times I will briefly show how national 
militaries act differently in Iraq. Under the heading “Legacy of Empire Guides British 
Troops in Iraq”, John F. Burns (2004) claims that divergent perspectives have resulted in 
different fighting strategies:  
 
                                                 
2 NUPI database on KFOR V  
     
 5
“At Falluja, Najaf, Samarra and Tal Afar, and in Sadr City before the truce, the Americans hit 
hard, seeking to kill as many rebels as possible. The British, throughout the war, have favoured 
“less robust” fighting to contain the rebels with defensive actions, not to eliminate them.”  
 
Employment of lethal force was not to be the focus of the British approach to fighting. 
Burns quotes a British brigadier who claims that the British have learned the importance 
of adjusting to local cultures, and not to impose alien solutions, from its legacy as an 
empire. Burns concludes his article by illuminating parts of the “winning hearts and 
minds”3 mentality of the British army:  
 
“British soldiers are encouraged to engage amicably with ordinary Iraqis. As often as possible, 
they wear berets instead of helmets, travel in aging, soft-sided Land Rovers instead of armoured 
vehicles, and mount foot patrols with lowered weapons.” 
 
The Dutch approach is conveyed by the N.Y. Times journalist Norimitsu Onishi (2004), 
under the heading “Dutch Forces’ Objective: Rebuilding Iraq With Trust”. Onishi 
suggests that the Dutch have absorbed the national shame felt after the Srebrenica 
massacre in 1995, and have developed “the Dutch approach to patrolling.” The soldiers in 
effect act as part neighbourhood police officers and part as social workers. They assert 
that security increases by making soldiers accessible and vulnerable to their surroundings. 
Inaccessibility, on the other hand, decreases security. Support and consent are perceived 
as forms of protection. With the words of Onishi, parts of the “winning hearts and minds” 
strategy of the Dutch is as follows: “Instead of armoured vehicles, the Dutch drive 
vehicles that leave them exposed to the people around them. To encourage interaction 
with local residents, they go bareheaded and are forbidden to wear mirror sunglasses.” 
The Dutch contend that their soft approach will keep them safer than if they had pursued a 
harder approach like the Americans who, due to their anxiety for car-bombers, drive in 
armoured vehicles pointing guns at drivers to keep other cars at a distance.  
                                                 
3 Tacitly or actively winning the support and trust of the general population (The reader is referred to Mockaitis 
2003:21). 
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1.2.3 A brief introduction to civil-military cooperation, CIMIC 
 
The concepts of peacekeeping and civil-military cooperation have been undergoing a 
paradigm shift as a result of the new security landscape emerging after the end of the Cold 
War. Military commanders are now required to take into account factors of social, 
political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental, and humanitarian nature, the 
presence of international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), the presence of the media and the expectations of both the international and local 
communities when planning and conducting military operations (Bi-SC 86-3 article 2). 
Rollins (2001:123) lists some new and pressing questions for military commanders, such 
as where does the military mission end and where does that of the civilian partners begin? 
How is the NATO Commander to deal with the fact that there is such a wide range of 
civilian players? How does he reconcile the military organizational structures with looser 
civilian ones? The paradigmatic shift has had an impact both on national doctrines and on 
the doctrines of international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) and the United Nations (UN). The operations in the Balkans acted as a catalyst 
for CIMIC. NATO defines CIMIC as:  
 
“The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander 
and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, 
national and non-governmental organisations and agencies” (MC 411/1). 
 
Rich (2002) claims that most western states and NATO members in particular, broadly 
follow the NATO approach with variations in emphasis. Norwegian CIMIC is based on 
the NATO doctrine, as expressed by one CIMIC-officer “Norwegian CIMIC is NATO 
CIMIC, or NATO CIMIC is Norwegian CIMIC, that is our attitude.”4 As chapter four of 
                                                 
4 Interview 6 April, 2005 
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this thesis is dedicated to a thorough account of CIMIC, I will let these brief remarks 
suffice for now, and move on to illustrate the “variations in emphasis.”  
 
1.2.4 National approaches to civil-military cooperation 
 
In spite of increased doctrinal work both internationally and nationally, the concept of 
civil-military cooperation is still perceived as unclear and triggers a variety of 
associations by the different players (Jensen 2003:3).5 Rich (2002) stresses that no 
international consensus yet exists on what the concept of CIMIC should contain exactly. 
A Ministry of Defence (MoD) official whom I have interviewed points to the lack of a 
unified CIMIC-policy, and indicates that divergent approaches to the NATO doctrine 
constitute a problem.6    
 
The article “Civil-military cooperation in peace operations: the case of Kosovo” written 
by Mockaitis (2004) illustrates the different approaches to CIMIC which might occur in a 
PSO. He investigates how CIMIC was performed in the five multinational brigade (MNB) 
areas Kosovo was divided into, and I will briefly present the CIMIC approaches in four of 
the MNBs. In MNB West, run by the Italians, the most relevant point mentioned by 
Mockaitis (ibid:21) was the fact that the Italians understood the local culture and enjoyed 
good relations with the Kosovar Albanians.  
 
The Multinational Brigade Area North was run by the French. MNB North had what 
Mockaitis (ibid:11) labels a “flexible approach to CIMIC,” allowing for force protection 
rules where individual units could determine security measures appropriate to each task 
and situation. The CIMIC units had good relations with NGOs, but a limited humanitarian 
budget. The resources of MNB North were available for CIMIC projects throughout the 
                                                 
5 This source is quoted with permission from the author 
6 Interview 20 May, 2005 
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area of operations. The French units deployed for four months, among the shortest tours 
in KFOR causing grievances with their NGO counterparts.  
 
The Americans run the Multinational Brigade Area East. Extensive traditional force 
protection measures7 were an obstacle to CIMIC, or Civilian Affairs (CA) activities, 
which is the American label. The U.S. army did not allow individual units to determine 
security measures to fit particular tasks. Mockaitis (ibid:15) quotes the observation of one 
officer that “being dressed like a Ninja Turtle gets in the way,” impeding i.e. relationship 
building which is essential to CIMIC. Lia and Hansen (1998:39) state that based on the 
experiences in Bosnia and in the U.S. led humanitarian intervention in Somalia, the 
American forces seek a great degree of isolation, emphasising physical force protection. 
CIMIC activities were the preserve of dedicated CA units, and removed from the rest of 
the force. CIMIC was not perceived as vital to security. The CA teams had almost no 
material resources with which to conduct projects, but could lend their skills and expertise 
to civilian counterparts. The American units deployed for six months.  
 
Multinational Brigade Area South was run by the Germans, and here the CIMIC activities 
were conducted in a manner similar to the Americans, with what Mockaitis labels a 
“conservative approach” (2004:18). Excessive traditional force protection was combined 
with projects initiated to fulfil a national agenda. Mockaitis (ibid:20) points to the 
Austrians operating in MNB South, which had a very different and according to him more 
effective approach. Lacking a humanitarian budget, the Austrians located NGOs willing 
to fund projects and lend their military resources to it. The Austrians were innovative in 
charging an individual in the Austrian MoD with providing donors for CIMIC projects in 
Kosovo. The Austrian attitude to physical force protection was relaxed, adjusting 
armament and protective measures to the situation at hand.  
 
                                                 
7 Traditional force protection measures refer to physical measures to secure the force. The concept of force 
protection may be perceived as much broader, containing factors such as “situational awareness” and obtaining 
“good-will” with the local population  
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The British run Multinational Brigade Area Centre. Their expertise and experience with 
civil conflict and consequent “winning hearts and minds” philosophy were admired 
attributes. The brigade Commander proclaimed that “CIMIC is every soldier’s job” 
(ibid:24), and this is in line with the British doctrine which prescribes that many CIMIC 
tasks are to be conducted by conventional British troops rather than being the preserve of 
dedicated forces (Rich 2002). The British had a broader understanding of security, 
perceiving that good relations with the local community was just as important to force 
protection as flak jackets and barbed wire. Traditional force protection was perceived to 
potentially create a barrier between the peacekeepers and the local population (Mockaitis 
2004:25).  
 
Landon and Hayes (2001) explain the different national approaches to CIMIC by 
depicting a process where an initial “unity of effort” attitude based on the mandate are 
being processed through the national perspectives of the different contingencies, and this 
mission interpretation results in divergent executions of the mandate. This result in a 
spectrum, where they place the U.S. at one far end with their strict focus on force 
protection, the U.K. approach somewhere in the middle, and the Nordic and NATO 
approaches closer to the other end (ibid).   
 
1.3 Research question 
 
On the basis of section 1.2 I find it interesting to put forward the following research 
question:   
 
"What explains the Norwegian decision to contribute with a civil-military cooperation 
unit to the peace support operation in Afghanistan, and consequently what explains the 
Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan?" 
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The Norwegian CIMIC unit was offered to NATO in the fall of 2002.8 The unit consists 
of three CIMIC elements. The first element deployed in February 2003, and the mission 
was terminated in February 2004 upon the return of the third element. The research 
question has two parts, which will be analyzed in two separate chapters but subjected to 
the same theoretical frame. I have chosen to set up a competitive theoretical design, where 
a rationalist explanation model will be tested against a culturalist explanation model. The 
aim is to find out which model carries the most explanatory power in terms of explaining 
the research question. When analyzing the first part of the research question I will 
investigate to what degree certain rational and cultural variables have an impact on the 
decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan. My main focus will lie with the 
second part of the research question, where I will analyze how rational and cultural 
variables influence the approach of the Norwegian CIMIC unit to CIMIC in Afghanistan.  
 
1.4 Delimitations9 
 
The topic of this thesis is extensive, and consequently certain delimitations are required. 
Geographically the thesis will be limited to the PSO in Afghanistan. I have not done any 
field-observations in Afghanistan, which would have provided me with a more 
comprehensive picture, including the versions of relevant civilian parties. Comparing 
CIMIC approaches in different PSOs could be interesting, but due to a limited amount of 
space this is not attainable. Further on, as stated by the Director of the Strategic Studies 
Institute, Douglas C. Lovelace Jr., “examining diverse national approaches to CIMIC in 
the field reveals the best practices and common mistakes. Properly analyzed and learned, 
these lessons can inform the conduct of current and future operations” (in Mockaitis 
2004:iii). Due to accessible sources and the scope of the thesis a comparative study was 
unattainable. Still, the existence of different national approaches to CIMIC underlies this 
                                                 
8 E-mail correspondence with MoD official 20 July, 2005 
9 As a matter of simplicity I choose to write CIMIC instead of NATO CIMIC, and rather state explicitly when I am 
not writing about NATO CIMIC.  
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thesis, and by investigating how different variables have an impact on the Norwegian 
approach to CIMIC, I will offer some general remarks on the phenomenon of divergent 
approaches in the concluding sections.  
 
Due to limited space I will not elaborated on the transformation of the Norwegian armed 
forces which incrementally has taken place since the end of the Cold War. Further on I 
will focus on the army exclusively when elaborating on the military organizational 
culture, without any reference to the navy or the air force. Ulriksen (2002:23) states that 
national militaries and the different branches within the militaries vary strongly in their 
inner organization, culture and identity. The different perceptions within the branches 
influence the choice of tactics, doctrine, strategy and material. This thesis will not 
elaborate on this point, but focus on the army as CIMIC is an army discipline.   
 
CIMIC must not be confused with civil-military cooperation in a Norwegian “total-
defence” context. In White Paper 45 (2000-2001, article 4.3) the pillars of the Norwegian 
“defence concept” are presented. The defence concept provides the main directions for 
the Norwegian defence policy. The pillars are 1) a modern and flexible defence; 2) allied 
and international defence-cooperation; 3) conscription; and 4) civil-military cooperation. 
The “total defence” is based on the principle of being able to mobilize the collective 
resources of the nation if Norway or the Alliance should be attacked (ibid:4.3.4). Recently 
the concept of “total defence” has been integrated into a wider perspective with the label 
“civil-military cooperation” (ibid:2.3), incorporating the need for a comprehensive 
utilization of civilian and military resources to maintain Norwegian security and interests 
(ibid:4.3.4). Despite basic common features, CIMIC in PSOs and civil-military 
cooperation in a “total defence” context are distinct concepts not to be confused with each 
other10.    
 
                                                 
10 The reader is referred to read more on civil-military cooperation and the related “total defence” concept in White 
Paper 45 (2000-2001) 
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1.5 Structure of the thesis 
 
In the introductory part I presented some new trends and conceptual developments in the 
field of peacekeeping and civil-military cooperation, and showed how different national 
militaries approach international military missions differently. Based on this I formulated 
a research question. The second part of this thesis will present the theoretical and 
methodological frameworks. In the theoretical chapter I will deduce four hypotheses, two 
for each part of the research question. The hypotheses will be deduced from two theories. 
These theories are the rational policy model developed by Graham Allison and a 
culturalist theory developed by Elizabeth Kier. The methodological chapter will describe 
how I operationalize my four hypotheses, discuss the reliability and validity of the 
hypotheses, and present the sources I rely on. The third part is an empirical background 
chapter, which goes into depth on civil-military cooperation and also briefly presents my 
case, which is Norwegian civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan. The analysis is the 
fourth part of the thesis. This part is comprised by two chapters, one for each part of the 
research question. Finally, in part seven, both empirical and theoretical findings are 
presented and discussed. On the basis of such findings certain conclusions are drawn.   
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Part 2: Theoretical and methodological approaches 
 
 
2. Theoretical approach 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework suited to investigate the 
research question. The theoretical framework will be employed as an analytical tool based 
on two explanatory models, or substantive theories,11 derived from rationalism and 
culturalism respectively. Based on the assumptions of rationalism I will apply the first 
model developed by Graham Allison, the rational policy model. The culturalist approach 
will be based on the works of Elizabeth Kier. First I will describe these two substantive 
theories and explain why they are suited to form the theoretical framework for my 
research question. Next I will develop one rationalist and one culturalist hypothesis which 
may explain the first part of the research question, and consequently the same procedure 
for the second part of the research question. I have chosen to set up a competitive design, 
and will make some remarks on this choice in section 2.5.  I will conclude the theoretical 
chapter with presenting certain challenges to the theoretical framework.  
 
2.2 How to investigate the research question 
 
The research question presented in the introductory chapter makes for the following 
inquiry:  
 
                                                 
11 Jupille (et al. 2002:5) define substantive theories as ”…a system of conditional statements about the relationships 
among specific variables.” 
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"What explains the Norwegian decision to contribute with a civil-military cooperation 
unit to the peace support operation in Afghanistan, and consequently what explains the 
Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan?" 
 
Landon and Hayes (2001:2) state that the variety of national approaches to CIMIC “… is 
due in part to different nations being involved in different types of military commitments 
in the past 50 years, and in part to their different perspectives of their own national 
interests.” In this quote they suggest that a combination of previous military experiences 
and national interests have an impact on the development of a certain approach to CIMIC. 
National interests are a rationalist variable, whilst historic military commitments perhaps 
hint to more culturalist variables such as learning, identity and culture. In light of this I 
find it interesting to develop a theoretical framework based on rationalism and 
culturalism.  
 
Rationalism is a meta-theoretical approach in the study of International Relations (IR), 
and therefore can not serve as a substantive theory in itself (Christiansen et al. 2003:3). 
The label “culturalism” is used by Desch (1998:141) amongst others, and is not to be 
confused with the meta-theoretical approach of constructivism but rather considered as a 
research program12 focusing on cultural factors when attempting to explain empirical 
phenomenons. One may claim that culturalism belongs to the family of moderate or 
conventional constructivist theories. According to Jupille et al. (2002:9) “… moderate 
constructivists often explore the role of social facts – norms or culture - in constructing 
the interests and identities of states/agents.” As Jupille et al. (ibid) point out, 
constructivism harbours a range of currents of thinking, and this is equally true for 
rationalism.   
 
                                                 
12 Desch (1998:155) defines “research program” as clusters of theories that share the same core assumptions, but 
might have different auxiliary assumptions, which could lead them to make different predictions about the same case 
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2.2.1 Rationalism and the Rational Policy Model 
 
The traditionally dominant meta-theoretical approach in the field of IR has been 
rationalism, and the traditionally dominant rationalist theory has been realism. Arguably 
there is not one, but several currents of realist thought sharing a set of key assumptions. 
Kenneth Waltz is the founding father of the realist current of thinking known as “neo-
realism.”13 In neo-realism the prime interests of states are fixed and maximized. Security 
in terms of survival and protection from threats are on top of the hierarchy of interests. 
The international system is perceived as anarchic and conflictual. In neo-realism the 
structure of the international system conditions the behaviour of states, and the central 
instrument for maintaining security is military capacity. Hence a strong military power is 
a central aim.  
 
Neo-realism postulates that similar threats lead to similar responses, in other words, neo-
realism suggests that faced with the same threat-picture, nations will choose the same 
military response. Diverging responses indicate that the threat-picture is perceived 
differently. Neo-realism expects similar doctrines to emerge in comparable states. This 
gives rise to a weakness with neo-realism in the new security-political landscape. Neo-
realism seems to be bound up to an old mental map stemming from the Cold War, where 
the landscape of security policy was very different from today and tied up to a bipolar 
imagery. Transformations of militaries and perceptions have gradually taken place in 
most Western countries, to adjust to the new circumstances. One might suggest that some 
countries have been and still are clinging to a “constructed threat-picture”, whilst other 
countries more readily have adjusted to a more “realistic threat-picture” mirroring the new 
realities. One country seemingly clinging to an old, territorial perception of threats against 
national security is Finland, as expressed in the Finnish defence report published in 2004. 
According to the Norwegian Defence Attaché in Finland, Colonel Ivar Lars Viddal, the 
                                                 
13 His well-known book “Theory of International Politics”, published in 1979, established the basis for the neo-realist 
school 
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defence of the Finnish territory is still on top of the agenda in Finland, in addition to 
active international participation (Svela 2005).  
 
To analyze the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit and the consequent Norwegian 
approach to CIMIC in Afghanistan I choose not to employ neo-realism. As we have 
already seen, there are a variety of approaches to CIMIC, arguably also amongst 
comparable states. Instead I will use the rational policy model developed by Graham 
Allison, which allows me to look more into national security-political objectives and the 
military and political means required to reach such objectives. The rational policy model 
is also advantageous due to its simplicity and capacity to easily deduce hypotheses.  
 
In his well-known article from 1969, Graham T. Allison claims that most analysts explain 
the behaviour of national governments in terms of one basic conceptual model, which he 
entitles the Rational Policy Model (Allison 1969:690). Allison stipulates that the agent is 
usually a nation or a government, conceived as a rational, unitary decision maker. When 
faced with a strategic problem, the agent is provided with a “spectrum of options” 
constituting the various relevant courses of action (ibid:694). Each alternative course of 
action produces consequences, providing the agent with a “spectrum of consequences.” 
Attached to each consequence are benefits and costs related to strategic goals and 
objectives. The agent is now presented with a choice. The rational agent pursues a rational 
choice, selecting the course of action whose consequences maximizes its goals and 
objectives (ibid). The principle aims of the agent are national interests and national 
security. Allison further claims that the nation is moved to act by threats and opportunities 
arising in the “international strategic market place” (ibid). Resources are deployed 
strategically, in order to further national interests. Cultural factors may be deployed to this 
end (Katzenstein in Katzenstein (ed.) 1996: 17). Theories based on the rationalist 
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framework generally direct attention away from cultural variables, treating them as mere 
epiphenomena.14   
 
The “essentially contested concept”15 of security needs some further elaboration before 
proceeding. As the international security landscape has changed following the end of the 
Cold War, so has the security concept. The theoretical literature suggests different 
definitions of national security. The narrow, traditional definition of security wants to 
retain a military focus, whilst the “wideners” want to extend the range of issues on the 
security agenda (Buzan 1997:5). Despite the relevance of an extended security concept, 
this thesis adopts a traditional, narrow definition of security. This is in accordance with 
the rationalist framework and the rational policy model. When it comes to the alternative 
culturalist explanatory model it might, as Katzenstein suggests (in Katzenstein (ed.) 
1996:11), have been easier to broaden the concept of security and investigate a “new” 
security issue. But then, as Katzenstein argues, the rationalist framework would not have 
been met on its “preferred ground” (ibid). Civil-military cooperation in PSOs belongs to 
the military domain and is a “hard case”, despite the fact that CIMIC as a tool is part of 
the stabilization efforts and does not belong to the sharper end of the spectre of military 
contributions.  
 
2.2.2 Culturalism and Elizabeth Kier 
 
The unexpected end of the Cold War sparked a renewed interest in the search for cultural 
explanations for state behaviour in the international system. According to Desch 
(1998:141) we are now at the high watermark of a third wave16 of culturalism in the field 
of international security studies. This wave, claims Desch, comprises a heterogeneous lot 
                                                 
14 Epiphenomenon: a secondary phenomenon associated with and apparently due to a primary phenomenon 
15 Label made by W. B. Gallie to describe core concepts in the social sciences such as power, justice, peace, equality 
and freedom, all of which are difficult concept which have inspired large literatures (quoted in Buzan 1991:7) 
16 Desch (1998) identifies the World War II wave, the Cold War wave and the post-cold War wave of cultural 
theorizing in the field of international security studies 
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united in the belief that realism is an overrated body of theory, and that cultural theories, 
which look to ideational factors, are more valid in explaining how the world works. 
Katzenstein claims that “… the Cold War made relatively unproblematic some of the 
cultural factors affecting national security. Theories that abstracted from these factors 
offered important insights…” but, with the end of the Cold War “Issues dealing with 
norms, identities and culture are becoming more salient” (in Katzenstein (ed.) 1996: 2).  
 
In “The culture of National Security: Norms and Security in World Politics”, edited by 
Katzenstein, a number of empirical and theoretical essays question the rationalist premise 
of treating national interests as fixed. Katzenstein states the following:  
 
“State interests do not exist to be “discovered” by self-interested, rational actors. Interests are 
constructed through a process of social interaction. “Defining”, not “defending”, the national 
interest is what this book seeks to understand” (in Katzenstein (ed.) 1996:2). 
 
The argument put forward is that security interests are defined by actors who respond to 
cultural factors, emanating from either its domestic or its international environments, or 
possibly from both. Elizabeth Kier has written one of the empirical essays in the 
Katzenstein volume. She has also extended her argument in “Imagining War: French and 
British Military Doctrine between the Wars” published in 1997. I will apply Kiers’ 
framework for analyzing the choice of military doctrine to my study of civil-military 
cooperation. One argument for using her analytical model is that, despite some 
weaknesses which I will elaborate on later, her framework offers a comprehensive model 
for investigating the impact of culture.  
 
Elizabeth Kier (1997) argues that doctrinal developments are best understood from a 
cultural perspective, focusing on cultural factors in domestic environments. She argues 
that different domestic political cultures will adopt divergent military doctrines based on 
concerns about the domestic balance of power, not on external strategic factors. She 
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claims that the French domestic political and military organizational cultures before 
World War II prevented the French from developing a doctrine better suited to avoid the 
defeat of May 1940. The French civilian leadership were more concerned with the 
domestic threat from the French military than with the threat from Germany. Furthermore, 
she argues that a cultural approach applies to military organizations as well as to civilian 
policymakers. She claims that not all military organizations have the same culture, and 
that these differences often account for their doctrinal preferences (Kier 1997:21). 
Military organizations have different world views and divergent perceptions about the 
proper conduct of a mission (Kier in Katzenstein (ed.) 1996:187). In her own words 
“…the interaction between the constraints set in the domestic political arena and the 
military’s organizational culture shapes the choice between offensive and defensive 
military doctrines” (Kier 1997:21).  
 
To determine “political culture” Kier focus on civilian policymakers’ beliefs about the 
role of the armed forces in the domestic arena. She (ibid:26) launches a number of 
questions to help determine political culture, of which I will focus on one, asking “What 
is the perception of the role of the military in society?”17 Kier (ibid) suggests that a state’s 
experiences with the military in the state-building process often provide the answer to this 
question.  
 
Kier defines organizational culture as “…the set of basic assumptions, values, norms, 
beliefs and formal knowledge that shape collective understandings” (ibid:28). She claims 
that research on organizational culture is “particularly well suited to studying the 
military” (ibid). The main reason for this it that the military organization may be 
perceived as a “total institution” (ibid:29), characterized by long-term membership, 
powerful assimilation mechanisms, and the definition of its member’s status, identity, and 
interactions by the organization.    
 
                                                 
17 The other questions are not considered relevant to my case 
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Kier refuses the basic rationalist assumption that preferences are given and interests self-
evident, and aims at showing how actors’ cultures help define their interests. Further on 
she claims that a state’s position in the international system is indeterminate of choices 
between offensive and defensive doctrines. Consequently Kier abolishes two vital 
assumptions from the rational policy model. She challenges the assumption of 
exogenously given interests, and the assumption that nations are moved to act by threats 
and opportunities arising in the “international strategic market place.” Stressing the 
“indeterminacy of the international system” Kier suggests that the international system 
does not guide actions (1997:12).18   
 
2.3 What explains the Norwegian decision to contribute with a civil-
military cooperation unit to Afghanistan? 
 
To analyze the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan I will infer two 
hypotheses, based on the rational policy model and Kier respectively.   
 
2.3.1 National security-policy interests and military-strategic objectives 
 
The dependent variable in this part of the research question is a dichotomy, varying 
between the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit19 and the decision not to. According 
to the rational policy model we expect that an agent acts based on rational calculations of 
the alternative courses of action, aiming to maximize strategic goals. To the political 
authorities, the strategic goal will be to maximize national security-policy interests. To the 
military agent the strategic goal will be to achieve military-strategic objectives in 
                                                 
18 According to Desch (1998:169) “When a state faces either external or internal threats, structure is determinative; 
when it faces both, or neither, structure is indeterminate. In such an indeterminant threat environment, it is necessary 
to look to other variables to explain various types of strategic behaviour. Culture and other domestic variables may 
take on greater independent explanatory power in these cases.” Consequently Desch would prescribe the structure as 
determinative in the French case as presented by Kier, where she ignores the international environment but points to 
internal threats due to a strong military.    
19 Most, if not all national contingencies have CIMIC or liaison officers integrated in the contingency, here I am 
talking about specifically organized CIMIC units working in parallel with the contingencies 
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accordance with the defined national security-policy interests. Based on the postulates 
forwarded by Allison, the hypothesis claims the following:  
 
H 1: To contribute with a civil-military cooperation unit to Afghanistan was a rational 
course of action maximizing Norwegian security-policy interests and military-strategic 
objectives. 
 
How I intend to operationalize my hypotheses will be elaborated in the methodological 
chapter.  
 
2.3.2 Political culture and military organizational culture 
 
As mentioned earlier, Kier aims at showing how the culture of actors define their 
interests, refuting the rationalist assumption that interest are exogenously given. Whereas 
the Norwegian security-policy interests were “defended” by means of contributing with a 
CIMIC unit to Afghanistan in the rationalist hypothesis, the culturalist hypothesis rather 
claims that: 
 
H 2: To contribute with a civil-military cooperation unit to Afghanistan was a Norwegian 
interest defined by Norwegian political and military organizational culture.  
 
2.4 What explains the Norwegian approach to civil-military 
cooperation in Afghanistan? 
 
As mentioned before, the main focus of the thesis lies with this part of the research 
question. The analysis will be based on the same theoretical framework as the first part, 
and accordingly I will infer two hypotheses, one from each substantive theory.   
 
     
 22
2.4.1 Military rationalism and national security-policy interests 
 
The dependent variable, approach to CIMIC, is not a dichotomy when analyzing the 
second part of the research question. To use Mockaitis’ labels, the approach to CIMIC 
may vary along a spectre, ranging from the “conservative approach” on one end through 
the “flexible approach” and to what might be labelled the “liberal approach” on the other 
end. The “liberal approach” to CIMIC could be characterized by a minimum of traditional 
force protection measures and access to humanitarian funds 
 
The rational policy model assumes that the rational agent will act based on rational 
calculations of the alternative courses of action, aiming to maximize strategic goals. The 
agent is the Norwegian CIMIC elements. The strategic goal would be to maximize 
national security-policy interests and to act rationally judged from a military position. To 
act “militarily rationally” would be to act in accordance with the doctrine, but adjusted to 
the current situation in the area of operations. Hence the rationalist hypothesis states the 
following: 
 
H 3:  The Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan was a 
rational military approach maximizing Norwegian security-policy interests.   
 
2.4.2 Culture and social learning 
 
When transferring Kiers framework to the second part of my research question, I must 
replace her dependent variable, choice of military doctrine, with approach to CIMIC, the 
independent variables political culture and military organizational culture being the same. 
The culturalist hypothesis seeking to explain the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit 
to Afghanistan had an internal, domestic focus similar to Kiers. When it comes to the 
Norwegian approach to CIMIC it may be argued that the internal focus must be 
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supplemented with an external focus. By doing this I question the causality developed by 
Kier when it comes to applicability to small states. Her cases are France and Great 
Britain, great powers which yield support to her causal claims. But when it comes to 
small states, it might be the case that the military organizational culture is causally 
influenced by the military cultures of other countries in addition to the political culture. 
Kier’s theoretical framework focuses on the cultural-institutional domestic environment, 
and ignores the international environment. This may prove to be a weakness in the 
multinational operational environments militaries are faced with today. When it comes to 
the Norwegian approach to CIMIC, I will suggest that “social learning” from the 
international environment, in terms of “a social process through which agent properties 
and preferences change as a result of interaction” (Checkel 2000:2), also may have an 
impact. Accordingly the culturalist hypothesis makes the following presumption: 
 
H 4:  The Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan was a 
product of the Norwegian political and military organizational culture and the impact of 
social learning.   
 
I assume that “social learning” does not have any significant impact on the decision to 
contribute with CIMIC to Afghanistan. I would rather suggest that it might have had an 
impact on the decision to develop the capacity in the first place, but that is another 
question.  
 
2.5 Models of theoretical dialogue 
 
It is sometimes claimed that IR is driven forward by great debates. Katzenstein et al. 
(1998) propose in the introduction to the golden anniversary issue of International 
Organization that the debate between rationalism and constructivism will increasingly be 
in the centre of attention. The aim of this thesis is not to engage in a meta-theoretical 
debate. But as I am setting up a theoretical framework based on competitive hypotheses 
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from rationalism and culturalism, it is in order to comment on the relationship between 
the meta-theoretical positions on which the framework is based. When assessing 
rationalism and constructivism from a meta-theoretical stance, their divergent positions 
when it comes to questions of ontology, epistemology and methodology20 yields the 
impression that these approaches are irreconcilable.  
 
Jupille et al. seek to identify “….four distinct modes of theoretical conversation: 
competitive testing; additive theory based on complementary domains of application; 
sequencing of theories; and incorporation (subsumption)” (2002: 14). When applying two 
explanatory models it is important to be clear on the intended relationship between the 
two models. My analytical framework is based on competitive testing. According to 
Jupille et al. (ibid:15) “Competitive testing means that we do not evaluate our claims only 
against “the evidence”, but against other theories as well (and, of course, other theories 
imply other evidence).” Competitive testing seeks to confirm some theories and refute 
others (ibid:14). The additive and sequential approaches attempt to “…build a more 
comprehensive composite in which the whole provides some gains over partial 
representations, all while preserving the integrity of the contributions of the parts” (ibid). 
Subsumption is hegemonic, implying that “More powerful theories absorb less powerful 
ones…and then…reproduce these “weaker” theories as derived special cases” (ibid).    
 
Despite the fact that the meta-theoretical foundations of rationalism and constructivism 
seemingly are at odds, many authors, such as Checkel (2000), have attempted “bridge-
building” efforts. I will return to this in my concluding chapter.  
  
 
                                                 
20 Any philosophy of science includes ontological claims, that is claims about the nature of existence, 
epistemological considerations, that is claims about what would constitute valid knowledge, and methodological 
implications, which is the practice of how we come to know (Wight 2002:41). 
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2.6 Challenges to the theoretical framework 
 
In this section I will present certain challenges to my theoretical framework.  
 
2.6.1 The “fruitfulness” of a unitary, rational actor paradigm 
 
Rationalist theories have been subject to a lot of criticism. Much of it is based on the fact 
that rationalism focuses on being a parsimonious framework, at the expense of obtaining 
more complex, empirically relevant theoretical frameworks.  
 
Underdal (1984) has developed a series of criteria to judge the “fruitfulness” of a 
theoretical model. He uses the criteria generality, conclusiveness, validity and parsimony 
to assess the fruitfulness of the unitary, rational actor paradigm (ibid:73), which is a vital 
rationalist assumption and basic to the rational policy model. Underdal claims that the 
unitary rational actor paradigm is potentially very general, despite the fact that some 
authors limit its applicability to certain interests, situations and countries. When it comes 
to conclusiveness the capacity to generate propositions may be prevented when applied to 
decisions made with uncertainty. Parsimony, or research economy, is a great advantage to 
the model. Underdal stresses that the main target of criticism has been related to validity 
(1984:73). Underdal concludes that “…it is so abundantly clear that the fruitfulness of the 
unitary, rational actor model – as well as of its alternatives – very much depends on the 
analytical purposes and the empirical instances to which they are applied” (ibid:78). The 
unitary rational actor paradigm, and consequently the rational policy model, seems 
“fruitful” in my case, due to the fact that the interests being studied are national-security 
interests, the Norwegian government traditionally share a common platform in foreign- 
and security policy, and decisions are made with a reasonable degree of certainty. 
 
A problem for rationalist theory is the prospect of an “embarrassment of interests”, 
analogous to the “embarrassment of norms,” which will be dealt with later, in which any 
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behaviour can be explained by reference to some interests. A culturalist would object to 
rationalism claiming that the rationalist conceptual lenses overlook culture, norms and 
identity as important causal factors.  
 
2.6.2 Culturalism still at sea? 
 
Lapid, citing Jepperson and Swindler, states that “Culture’s ship has finally come in, and 
the time is ripe for an inventory of its cargo” (1996:3). The new cultural wave has been 
subject to much criticism from within the ranks of IR-theorizing.  
 
Desch (1998:150) identifies three potential challenges to assessing the explanatory power 
of culturalist theories in security studies. The first is that cultural variables are tricky to 
define and operationalize. Definitions commonly used by cultural theorists are often 
broad and imprecise, making them hard to operationalize. Kiers defines culture as “the set 
of basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs and formal knowledge that shape collective 
understandings” (1997:28), and her definition may be subject to such criticism. 
Ambiguous definitions of culture may complicate the formulation of testable theories 
using these variables (Desch 1998:151). The second challenge suggested by Desch is that 
some cultural theorists believe that cultural variables make every case sui generis. 
Consequently cultural theories are not broadly applicable and testable across a number of 
cases. Desch (ibid:155) claims that most theories based on domestic culture and 
organizational culture suffer from this problem, and that it illuminates the questionable 
compatibility of culture with a positivist approach to social science. The third challenge 
proposed by Desch is that culturalism is a research program, and hence it does not make 
sense to assess culturalism as such, researchers must rather test particular culturalist 
theories. Desch also ascribe realism as a research program, and states that researchers 
should rather look at particular sets of theories than pitting realism against culturalism. He 
also claims that both research programs contain theories that might challenge each other 
(ibid:156).  
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Desch also claims that the post-Cold War wave of cultural theorizing has not selected 
“hard cases” for testing their cultural theories. Previously I have suggested, along the 
lines of Katzenstein, that my case is a “hard case” for cultural theorizing. Desch states 
that:  
 
“The new culturalists believe that they have chosen “hard cases” for their theories just because 
they focus on national security issues. But what makes a case a “crucial test” and a “hard case” is 
(1) whether the competing theories make different predictions about its outcome, and (2) whether 
one theory should be expected to do better at predicting it than another. Issue area, by itself, does 
not make a case hard or easy” (ibid:166).    
 
Desch makes Kier subject to his critique, claiming that realists would make similar 
predictions as her, though anticipating that changes in French military doctrine rather 
reflected Europe’s changing balance of power (ibid:162). Desch concludes by stating that 
“In short, the new culturalist theories will not supplant realist theories in national security 
studies because, by themselves, they have very little explanatory power” (ibid:170).  
 
According to Kowert and Legro, “sources” of norms remain ill defined, incompletely 
theorized, and understudied (in Katzenstein (ed.) 1996: 454). Kowert and Legro 
(ibid:469) criticize the authors of the essays in the Katzenstein volume for treating their 
core concepts as exogenously given, explicitly acknowledging that actor identity and 
behavioural norms are socially constructed, but then proceeding to focus on the impact of 
these social constructions. Kier seems to neglect the process of norm construction in her 
analysis of French and British military doctrines. The norms and cultures of the agents 
appear as exogenously given, as she focuses on the impact of the particular norms and 
cultures. This study will not elaborate on the “sources” of the cultures anticipated to have 
an impact on civil-military cooperation. It will be assumed to be beyond the scope of this 
study, but nonetheless of great importance and the lack of it representing a weakness as 
     
 28
such. Kowert and  Legro (ibid:467) also point to the “embarrassment of norms” issue, 
acknowledging that multiple norms may influence actors and that ultimately any 
behaviour can be explained with reference to some norm. Finally, agents sometimes 
manipulate or change norms. This is equivalent to what Kier refers to as “entrepreneurs” 
manipulating or instrumentally using culture to serve their purposes (1997:32).  
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3. Methodological approach 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to study why Norway decided to contribute with a civil-
military cooperation unit to the PSO in Afghanistan, and subsequently the Norwegian 
approach to CIMIC in Afghanistan. In this chapter I will operationalize my four 
hypotheses. To operationalize is to demonstrate how the variables are to be measured. I 
will also assess the reliability and validity of my operationalizations, and present the 
sources I have used. First I will present the research design of the study, which is the tool 
chosen for investigating whether the theoretically founded hypotheses get empirical 
support.  
 
3.2 The research design: single case study 
 
The point of departure for this study is a relatively new phenomenon, civil-military 
cooperation in PSOs. Hence the study will have an investigative and problem-identifying 
character. The objective is to gain further insight and understanding of the empirical 
phenomenon. The thesis will to a certain degree have a conceptual focus. According to 
Frantzen, concepts are important because they provide a common language necessary for 
our understanding. Further on: 
 
 “A new strategic environment, new threats and risks and new norms as well as roles and tasks 
necessitate new conceptualisation. Defence policy and doctrines provide this conceptualisation… 
Conceptualisation of security and defence policy provides “mental maps” affecting policymaking 
and military implementation” (Frantzen 2005:5-6).  
 
     
 30
My research question provides me with two dependent variables, the first is the decision 
to contribute with a CIMIC unit, and the second is the Norwegian approach to CIMIC. 
Further on I operate with a set of independent variables, which is a general feature of 
case-studies. The case is time-limited. The Norwegian CIMIC contribution was offered to 
NATO in the fall of 2002, and the elements were deployed from 5 February, 2003 to 13 
February, 2004. Several of the sources I have used stem from this period of time, 
particularly news articles and official documents, but beyond that the sources I have used 
stem from a far bigger time-span, both of a newer and older date. Civil-military 
cooperation has been and still is an evolving concept, and I have studied the doctrinal and 
operational developments and understandings of the concept. The national decision-
making process and formal proceedings concerning the CIMIC contribution to 
Afghanistan obviously precedes deployment. In this respect the time-frame as such 
appears as a bit artificial, as it is very much exceeded by the dating of relevant sources. 
Empirically the time-frame is accurate, as it comprises the time when a Norwegian 
CIMIC unit was offered and consequently deployed in Afghanistan.   
 
The definition of “case study” has been somewhat disputed, and hence a multitude of 
definitions are available. Yin (2003:13) develops what he calls a technical definition, 
comprising two parts:  
 
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident. The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which 
there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple 
sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another 
result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and 
analysis” 
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My study fits Yin’s definition on these accounts, which justifies the chosen research 
design. One of the advantages with case-studies is the possibility to study a specific theme 
in depth, and hence provide thorough insights into the empirical phenomenon on the basis 
of qualitative data.  
 
A general objection to case-studies is the lack of ability to produce general knowledge. 
Statistical generalization, that is “… an inference is made about a population (or universe) 
on the basis of empirical data collected about a sample” (Yin 2003:32), may not be drawn 
based on the case as cases are not “sampling units” (ibid). According to Yin, when doing 
case-studies the “…mode of generalization is “analytical generalization”, in which a 
previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical 
results of the case study” (ibid:32-33).  
 
Afghanistan was chosen as the single case for a number of reasons. As mentioned in 
section 1.4 a comparative case-study would be too extensive. Other relevant cases could 
have been Bosnia, Kosovo and recently Iraq. I will draw on experiences from these 
operations, and especially from Kosovo. What makes Afghanistan particularly interesting 
is the fact that this was the first time Norway contributed with specifically designed 
CIMIC elements. Mockaitis (2004:2) claims that humanitarian interventions are perhaps 
the most challenging type of CIMIC operations. He lists Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo as 
examples of such operations, where the military force intervenes to end fighting, to 
establish and preserve order, facilitate relief operations, and aid in the rebuilding of 
infrastructure and civil institutions in what could be labelled a “failed state”. The 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that CIMIC also has an important role to 
play in the war on terror. The hallmarks listed by Mockaitis must be considered relevant 
to these operations as well. In addition Stene (2005:47) refers to how some of her 
informants believed that the war on terror militarized the foreign policy of states and the 
humanitarian space, making civil-military issues even more pertinent after 11 September 
2001.   
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3.3 Operationalizing the hypotheses 
 
To analyze the hypotheses I will make use of the different levels of the military 
organization. The highest level is the political-strategic level, represented by the 
Norwegian government. This level provides the defence- and security-political objectives 
of the nation, and stipulates how the collected strategic tools are to be utilized, including 
the military resources (FFOD A: 150). The military-strategic level is responsible for the 
deployment and utilization of the military resources of the state within a superior political 
framework to achieve political-strategic goals. In Norway this level is represented by the 
Chief of Defence Norway (CHODN) and his staff (ibid:148). The operational level is the 
connection between the military-strategic objectives and the tactical deployments in a 
particular operational area (ibid:149). According to Nissen (2002:6-7) the operational 
level is of less interest in international operations due to levels of command and control 
being “compressed” in such operations. I will not elaborate further on this claim in 
general, but make the assumption that in my particular case the operational level is rather 
less relevant. This assumption is supported by one CIMIC-officer who had what might be 
labelled an operational position in Afghanistan, saying that “In reality, everything we did 
were on a tactical level, but we were playing different roles.”21 Accordingly the 
operational level will not be a part of the analysis. The tactical level is the utilization of 
military forces to achieve military objectives. This level is represented by the military 
units deployed to perform e.g. intelligence gathering, patrolling, combat missions, and for 
my purpose, civil-military cooperation.  
 
When analyzing the first part of the research question, asking what explains the 
Norwegian decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan, I will only discuss 
the political- and military-strategic levels, as the tactical level has not yet been activated. 
                                                 
21 Interview 23 August, 2005 
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In the second part of the research question, asking what explains the Norwegian approach 
to CIMIC, I will discuss this on the political-strategic and tactical levels, with the main 
focus placed on the tactical level.  
 
3.3.1 Operationalizing the Rational Policy Model hypotheses 
 
The first hypothesis based on the assumptions of the rational policy model suggests that: 
 
H 1: To contribute with a civil-military cooperation unit to Afghanistan was a rational 
course of action maximizing Norwegian security-policy interests and military-strategic 
objectives. 
 
I will investigate how two Norwegian security-policy interests may have had an impact 
on the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan on the political-strategic 
level. The first interest would be to secure continued relevance for NATO. According to 
Whitepaper 1 (2002-2003, article 2.2) Norway is profoundly dependent on committed 
international security-political cooperation. NATO is the most important guarantor for 
Norwegian sovereignty and an absolute precondition for an effective Norwegian security 
policy. Norway supported the extension of NATO tasks and role in order to secure the 
relevance of NATO, whilst emphasising that a credible Article 5 must still form the basis 
of the Alliance. Secondly, it would be a Norwegian security-policy interest to position 
Norway with a relevant niche-capacity. The transformation of NATO involves the 
development of niche-capacities which the Alliance needs. This enables “small” NATO 
members to make meaningful contributions (Styrke og relevans 2004, article 170), and it 
entails an increased role-specialisation and division of labour within NATO (ibid: article 
171).  
 
Further on I will study how five military-strategic objectives may have had an impact on 
the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit on the military-strategic level. The first is the 
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Norwegian participation in CIMIC Group North (CGN). The Norwegian engagement in 
this multinational framework would suggest that Norway is committed to developing 
CIMIC and deploying CIMIC elements. A second objective is cost-effectiveness. The 
armed forces will seek to pursue strategies creating consistency between political goals, 
military means and funding. As a military tool CIMIC is cost-effective. Another potential 
objective for contributing with a CIMIC unit is the possibility of invaluable experience 
and training. According to Whitepaper 1 (2002-2003, article 4.3.2) international military 
engagements contribute to a strengthening of competence and the quality of the armed 
forces. Further on it might be an objective to investigate CIMIC as a concept, aiming to 
sort out some of the conceptual confusion obscuring the concept. Finally it might be a 
military-strategic objective to contribute with CIMIC in order to further advance the 
development of a Norwegian CIMIC policy. 
 
The second hypothesis based on the rational policy model suggests that: 
 
H 3:  The Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan was a 
rational military approach maximizing Norwegian security-policy. 
  
The armed forces are a political instrument, and act primarily as a foreign policy tool. 
Often the most important motive behind Norwegian participation in PSOs and other 
military operations is to secure involvement in the decision-making processes concerning 
Norwegian security. To be able to secure such involvement it is important to commit 
visible force contributions. A visible force contribution would forward the two Norwegian 
security-policy interests identified in the previous part of this section. On the political-
strategic level I will analyze how visibility became apparent in the Norwegian approach 
to CIMIC. To measure a “rational military approach” I will discuss how the Norwegian 
CIMIC elements acted in accordance with the NATO CIMIC doctrine and situational 
requirements. The point of departure will be the three core functions of CIMIC as 
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established in the NATO CIMIC doctrine, namely civil-military liaison, support to the 
civil environment and support to the force. 
 
3.3.1.1 The validity of the Rational Policy Model hypotheses  
 
The link between the research question and the data material provided to respond to it is 
essential to the case-study method. This link is vital to the ability to generate valid 
conclusions. Underdal defines validity as “the extent to which a model succeeds in 
capturing the essence of the real-world phenomena it is intended to represent” (1984: 73). 
Yin labels it “construct validity”, defined as “establishing correct operational measures 
for the concepts being studied” (2003:34). He continues to state that the procedure to 
strengthen construct validity is to follow three steps (ibid). The first step is to use multiple 
sources of evidence. The second is to establish a chain of evidence, that is, to enable the 
reader to follow the derivation of any evidence. The third step is to have key informants 
review the draft case study report. 
 
To investigate the first hypothesis I will study policy through official statements and 
documents. Frantzen (2005:3-4) quotes Frankel and emphasises the need to exercise 
caution in such an undertaking, as “a policy process is most of the time reactive and short 
term, geared towards imminent problems and challenges… coherence does not always 
exist between official, stated, long-term ambitions and the day-to-day policymaking 
process.” I hope to mend this by resorting to multiple sources of evidence. Interviews in 
the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) will 
supplement the official documents and possibly shed some light on the day-to-day 
policymaking process. I have interviewed five MoD and MFA officials, whereas one 
MFA official had served as a diplomat in the Norwegian embassy in Kabul during the 
deployment of the Norwegian CIMIC unit. One of the MoD officials was a Senior Staff 
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Officer (SSO) with responsibility for CIMIC in CHODN’s staff and later in the MoD 
when the two integrated in 2003.  
 
The data used to study the second hypothesis is mainly interviews, but also a range of 
other sources such as scientific publications and newspaper articles. Hence multiple 
sources of evidence are secured. When relying on secondary literature it is important to be 
on guard towards the personal interpretations of the authors. The validity of newspaper 
articles might be a problem, as the articles may be biased by personal opinions, and as 
they are not subject to scientific standards. It is essential to be aware of this particularly as 
many both scientific and newspaper-articles written on the civil/military relationship tend 
to be biased in one way or the other. This may be avoided by using several and 
independent sources. I also gained access to a database made by the Norwegian Foreign 
Policy institute (NUPI) on KFOR V, containing 66 formal interviews of officers serving 
in KFOR V.  
 
3.3.1.2 The reliability of the Rational Policy Model Hypotheses 
 
Reliability is according to Yin (2003:34) “demonstrating that the operations of a study – 
such as the data collections procedures – can be repeated, with the same results.” The 
point is that if the same case study was to be conducted once again by another 
investigator, he should arrive at the same findings and conclusions when following the 
same procedures. The goal is to minimize errors and biases (ibid:37). To achieve this it is 
important to document all steps during the study.  
 
The official sources I rely on are easily accessible for a reliability-check. When it comes 
to the interviews in the Ministries they will be harder to repeat, as I did not follow an 
interview-guide. The interviews took rather the form of unstructured, informal 
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interviews22 where I presented some framing topics and the officials talked at will, also 
introducing new topics. This method and the fact that the informants are anonymous 
presented me with interesting insights, but at the same time decreased the reliability.  
 
The extensive use of interviews is the most evident reliability-challenge. I have 
interviewed five CIMIC-officers who have been deployed to Afghanistan. To achieve a 
broader perspective I have also interviewed one person who worked in the humanitarian 
sector in Afghanistan.  The informants are anonymous. I used a recorder during most 
interviews, which increased the level of accuracy when transcribing the interviews. Two 
interviews were phone-interviews due to distance. The interviews were made during the 
spring, autumn and fall of 2005. The informants cover all three CIMIC elements, and are 
all men. They hold different military ranks, but I choose to call them all CIMIC-officers 
to secure their anonymity. The CIMIC-officers interviewed were presented with an 
interview guide, which more easily allows for repeat than the unstructured, informal 
interviews made at the Ministries. Still, the questions were open, allowing the respondent 
to formulate the answer as he pleased. The time-gap between the deployment and the 
interviews may have given rise to uncertainties in terms of memory-lapse. I hope to avoid 
this by means of cross-checking information using several independent sources, but still 
personal perceptions does not allow closer scrutiny and may weaken the reliability as 
such. Leading questions and misinterpretations are also possible pitfalls. I intended to 
mend this by using my first interview as a pilot-interview and subsequently made slight 
changes to the interview-guide based on this experience. I tried to avoid 
misinterpretations by letting the interviewees read through any part of the study where 
they had been quoted. Yet it is essential to acknowledge the existence of interpretations in 
interviews. This is inherent in the nature of interviews.23 I have translated the interviews 
from Norwegian to English, and some of the interviewees did not quite recognize their 
                                                 
22 The reader is referred to read more in Hellevik (1999:108-109) 
23 The reader is referred to read more in Kvale (1997:17) 
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statements in English. In such cases the informants adjusted the statements when reading 
their final quotes. I have also translated quotes from Norwegian books and articles.  
 
Internet transcriptions have been frequently used. Due to the vast amount of information 
available on the internet the search-strategy is essential. The internet has provided me 
with several kinds of information, such as public documents, articles and press releases. 
The use of internet sources is burdened with difficulties, especially when it comes to 
references and the possibility to re-examine the material. I attempt to mend this by stating 
the URL address and the time of reading in the bibliography, but there is no assurance 
that the site will not change the address or simply be removed from the web.  
 
3.3.2 Operationalizing the culturalist hypotheses 
 
The culturalist hypotheses make the following presumptions:  
 
H 2: To contribute with a civil-military cooperation unit to Afghanistan was a Norwegian 
interest defined by Norwegian political and military organizational culture.   
 
H 4:  The Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan was a 
product of the Norwegian political and military organizational culture and the impact of 
social learning.    
 
Kier provides a comprehensive formula for operationalizing the independent variables 
political culture and military organizational culture. I will apply her operationalizations 
with some adjustments.  
 
To identify the Norwegian political culture I will present civilian policymakers’ beliefs 
about the role of the armed forces in society, in accordance with Kier’s question presented 
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in section 2.2.2. Kier focuses on the role of the armed forces on the domestic arena. For 
my purpose it is important also to discuss how civilian policymakers’ perceive the role of 
the armed forces beyond our borders. 
 
In his book “The Norwegian defence tradition” (2002) Ståle Ulriksen argues that the 
Norwegian armed forces for almost two hundred years, and specially the last hundred, 
have been designed first and foremost to cover other needs than the purely military ones 
(ibid:19). Strategic, doctrinal and tactical military concerns have given way to political 
considerations, and the Norwegian defence establishment has been heavily influenced by 
Norwegian nation-building. Ulriksen seems to support Kier’s assumption that the 
perception of the role of the military stems back to a state’s experiences with the military 
in the state-building process. Ulriksen claims that according to the Norwegian defence 
tradition of 1905 the role of the Norwegian armed forces outside of Norwegian territory 
was largely neglected or toned down by the imparters of the tradition. The focus was 
rather on events on Norwegian soil (ibid:35). The defence-tradition of 1940 was very 
much similar to the tradition of 1905. Still military efforts were merely valued if the effort 
was a direct battle for Norwegian territory (ibid:187), conscription as such was more 
important that military efficiency (ibid: 199), and the symbol of military force was the 
conscripted infantry soldier on skis (ibid:228).       
  
Terje Tvedt has developed the notion of “a national goodness-regime” 24 (2003:34). Tvedt 
writes that “…aid, human rights work and peace-policy have had an exceptional 
legitimacy in Norway” (2003:12), and continues “…the political leadership declared 
Norway as world-champion in aid, as the worlds best relief-nation, and as a humanitarian 
great power, almost without discussion, and with enthusiastic support…” (ibid:13). A 
national identity-producing project has been launched, tying the people’s identity to 
helping the poor of the world and promoting peace (ibid:18). The project also gains 
legitimacy by means of its perceived power- emptiness (ibid:23, footnote 6). This profile, 
                                                 
24 ”Et nasjonalt godhetsregime”   
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communicating Norway as a “Peace Nation” and Oslo as the “Peace City” has become 
Norway’s international brand (ibid:55). Though not dealt with by Tvedt, the Norwegian 
military plays an important role in his national goodness-regime by its regular 
participation in peacekeeping missions. Increasingly the perception of the role of the 
military in society has been tied to peacekeeping operations, and the discourse has been 
adjusted to the peace tradition.  
 
Two indicators on the political culture emerge. The first emanates from the domestic 
arena, constituting the legacy from the defence traditions of 1905 and 1940, with its focus 
on military events on Norwegian soil. The second has a broader perspective. It takes as a 
point of departure the claim forwarded by Ulriksen that the Norwegian armed forces have 
been designed first and foremost to cover other needs than the purely military ones. The 
indicator suggests that promoting the Norwegian self-image as a “peace nation” will be a 
primary objective. In the analytical chapters I will investigate how these indicators of the 
Norwegian political culture may have had an impact on the decision to deploy a CIMIC 
unit and the consequent approach to CIMIC in Afghanistan.   
 
As mentioned earlier, the elaboration on the military organizational culture will be limited 
to the army. This is not to suggest that there are great variances within the Norwegian 
defence establishment, but simply to limit the scope. This is not in line with Kier, who 
understands military culture as the organizational culture of a particular military, 
including all branches (1997:30). Her focus on the choice between offensive and 
defensive military doctrines makes for an abstraction from possible divergent military 
cultures within a national military establishment, whilst my focus on a specific force 
contribution allows me to focus on one branch.  
 
As written earlier, Kier defines organizational culture as “…the set of basic assumptions, 
values, norms, beliefs and formal knowledge that shape collective understandings” 
(1997:28). Military organizational culture, as political culture, is a very broad concept, 
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encompassing a possibly inexhaustible range of indicators. I will focus on indicators 
relevant to peacekeeping in general and civil-military cooperation in particular. Those are 
motivations in the Norwegian military for participating in PSOs, attitudes towards the use 
of force and consent, aspirations to humanitarian efforts and the level of humanitarian 
activity in Norwegian contingencies, and role-perceptions. This list is certainly not 
complete, but serves my purpose of presenting a piece of the Norwegian army’s military 
organizational culture in order to investigate my research question. In the following I will 
briefly present some research reflecting on these indicators, to provide a frame of 
reference. 
 
Ness (quoted in Mæland 2004:155) has done research on what motivates Norwegian 
soldiers to apply for international operations. He found that economic profit, a spirit of 
adventure and professional challenges were important motivational factors, whilst 
contributing to peace and security played a marginal role. Mæland (ibid:44) found in his 
selection of Norwegian officers serving in Kosovo a motivational aspect of having “a job 
to do”, distinct from more idealistic motives.  
 
Nissen (2002:10-11) defines military organizational behaviour using the definition of 
traditional peacekeeping given in section 1.2.1 as a point of departure. Two important 
dimensions are the use of force and consent. Norway traditionally favours a minimum use 
of force and place consent high on the agenda.  
 
Lunden (1999:107) lists three mental phases which a technical company of Norwegian 
soldiers deployed to Lebanon experienced in their attitudes towards aid to the local 
population. The phases went from “offensive optimism” through “laid-back 
disappointment” to “careful realism”. It seems that the aspiration to do a humanitarian 
effort is present, but alters when increasingly confronted with the realities on the ground. 
Mæland (2004) points to similar tendencies in his material from Kosovo, where increased 
experience with the local population altered the perceptions of soldiers and officers when 
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it came to providing humanitarian efforts and activities. The Lebanese civilian population 
were according to Lunden (ibid: 159) generally content with the Norwegians. They were 
observed to hold a medium range military activity and a high humanitarian activity. A 
high military activity included a high level of military coerciveness and of protection 
offered to the local population.  
 
The role-perception of soldiers and officers are changing and becoming more complex 
and multi-dimensional in accordance with the new security environment in which they are 
operating. For this “new” soldier Mæland (2004:146) emphasises the attitude, or virtue, of 
calmness25, which gives the owner the ability to keep the use of force on a low level and 
at the same time create and maintain good relations. Mæland implies that this attitude 
reflects the Norwegian mentality, and is a middle road between naiveté and the “Rambo-
like” (ibid:147). In the book “The Postmodern Military” (Moskos et al. 2000) the authors 
depict a change in the dominant military profession-type, moving from the “combat 
leader” during the world wars, via the “manager and technician” during the Cold War, to 
three kinds of postmodern soldier-types. The first kind is the “soldier-scholar”, 
represented by an intellectual and highly educated soldier able to take upon him 
demanding tasks for defence purposes. The second kind is the “soldier-statesman”, a 
soldier that govern the public and international room, such as by dealing with the media, 
or holding diplomatic skills enabling the soldier to cooperate with local authorities and 
non-governmental parties in a given conflict area (Moskos 2000:15-19). Mæland 
(2004:269-270) suggests the label “humanitarian military”, defined as soldiers who in a 
broad sense uses their military power to forward conditions for human life and 
development and does it in a way concurrent with the military mission (ibid:294). 
Mæland (ibid) stresses the existence of such hybrid soldiers, who are both military and 
humanitarian in their professional spirit, and emphasises the link between those two roles 
as being of the essence.  
 
                                                 
25 Sindighet 
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Kier (ibid.:30) makes three points about what the military organizational culture is not. 
First, it is not equal to “national character”. She acknowledges that a military culture may 
reflect some aspects of its society’s culture, but claims that the powerful assimilation 
mechanisms at play in the military can displace the influence of the civilian society. 
Second, military culture is not equivalent to strategic culture. The military organizational 
culture does not refer to the beliefs of civilian policymakers, which is rather incorporated 
into the political culture. Third, military culture and “military mind” must not be 
confused. Military culture does not refer to a general set of values and attitudes shared by 
all militaries. Military culture refers to “the organizational culture of particular militaries; 
it does not refer to the organizational culture of the military in general” (ibid.). On this 
last point I will embark on a slightly other path than Kier. Believing that it is not viable to 
study Norwegian military organizational culture in isolation, I will anticipate that social 
learning is occurring, influencing the military organizational culture at the tactical level. 
Social learning is measured by means of informants commenting on previous experiences 
with CIMIC, attendance to international training courses and social interaction with other 
contingencies during deployment.  
 
3.3.2.1 The validity and reliability of the culturalist hypotheses 
 
To analyze the culturalist hypotheses I will rely on primary and secondary sources. I will 
follow Kier’s advice and look for documents the military produces for its internal 
consumption, such as articles in military magazines, reports, briefs and doctrines. 
Documents produced to communicate with outsiders, and policymakers in particular, 
carry with it the difficulty in distinguishing “political expediency from genuine beliefs” 
(ibid:31). Still, the sources I have access to are not classified, and accordingly available to 
a public audience. Again I hope to resolve this by means of multiple and independent 
sources. The literature on Norwegian military culture is limited. Due to the contested 
concept of “culture”, the validity must be questioned. Am I really measuring what I intend 
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to measure? I have developed a number of indicators crystallized from the political and 
military organizational culture with a suggested relevance to civil-military cooperation. I 
will draw on the interview-material I have collected, and my remarks on reliability made 
before are valid for the culturalist hypotheses as well.  
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Part 3: Background  
 
 
4. Civil-military cooperation in theory and practice 
 
“The sooner I can get rid of the questions that are outside the military in 
scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes, I think I live ten years each 
week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic 
matters…And what a lot of headaches I found. Water supply shortage, 
no power, no food, no fuel, and corpses all over town…” 
           General Dwight D. Eisenhower 
 
 
In this chapter I will elaborate on civil-military cooperation, insert it into its historical, 
theoretical and practical context and present my case. First I will briefly draw some 
historical lines, before describing different CIMIC doctrines. Next I will present the civil 
component of a PSO, before placing CIMIC in the civil-military interface and briefly 
describing the Norwegian CIMIC discipline. Subsequently I will present my case, starting 
with a description of the crisis and the consequent military and humanitarian engagement 
in Afghanistan, before narrowing the scope to CIMIC in Afghanistan.   
 
4.1 A brief historical overview 
 
War has always involved an encounter between civil and military components. Mockaitis 
(2004:1) claims that “… civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is arguably as old as warfare 
itself…” Yet this encounter has become increasingly complex, demanding efficient tools 
to facilitate coordination and cooperation.  
 
According to Greve and Hertzberg (2001:11) the concept of CIMIC emerged during the 
Second World War. The U.S. established what they named “Civilian Affairs” (CA) 
responsible for the reconstruction of liberated areas. CA cooperated with civilians and 
contributed with capacities to reconstruct infrastructure and with humanitarian aid. Rana 
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(2004:571) emphasizes that both the concept of civil-military cooperation and that of civil 
affairs have been part of the major military operations of the twentieth century.  
 
The SSO emphasised that CIMIC is not new in NATO. The NATO School has been 
teaching CIMIC courses since the 1980s, if not before. Yet experiences from the military 
operations in the Balkans during the 1990s prompted NATO to execute a complete 
examination and revision of NATO policy (MC 411/1) and doctrine (AJP-9) on CIMIC. 
Simultaneously NATO allies were encouraged to establish CIMIC units.26 The growing 
importance of civil-military cooperation was also reflected in the policy and doctrines of 
the UN and the European Union (EU). In the next section I will present certain CIMIC 
doctrines, with a particular focus on the NATO CIMIC doctrine.         
 
4.2 CIMIC doctrines 
4.2.1 NATO 
 
The military and political transformations following the end of the Cold War spurred the 
evolvement of a new NATO Strategic Concept in 1991. A few years’ later NATO leaders 
realized that the Concept needed a re-examination due to the alteration of the strategic 
landscape since its adoption. In 1999 a new Strategic Concept was approved, aiming at 
equipping and guiding the Alliance for the new security challenges and opportunities of 
the 21st century. According to Frantzen (2005:2) it can be argued that during the 1990s 
PSOs became the most tangible and visible sign of NATO’s new role. In Article 10 of the 
new Security Concept, the Alliance admits it to be a fundamental security task “…to 
contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, 
including crisis response operations.” In Article 60 the Alliance acknowledges that “The 
interaction between alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and 
non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the success of operations.”  
                                                 
26 Interview 23 September, 2005 
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The primary objective of Allied Joint Publication 9 (AJP-9) “NATO Civil-Military Co-
operation (CIMIC) Doctrine” is to provide guidelines for the planning and execution of 
CIMIC in support of operations involving NATO military forces. AJP-9 was ratified 10 
May, 2004.27 NATO policy for CIMIC is laid down in Military Council 411/1, which 
came into force in 2001. NATO defines CIMIC as follows:  
 
“The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil 
actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-
governmental organisations and agencies” (MC 411/1). 
 
The definition states that NATO conducts CIMIC in support of the military mission. 
CIMIC as defined enables a Commander to interface with the civil components in the 
operational theatre and to fully absorb civilian parameters into his planning. CIMIC is 
intended to contribute to the establishment of a stable environment and to facilitate the 
reaching of the end-state. CIMIC is the Commander’s tool for building effective 
relationships, and harmonise civil-military interaction. We may identify three dimensions 
towards which CIMIC efforts are to be directed. These dimensions constitute the civilian 
component, and are the local authorities, the national population and the civilian 
humanitarian sector.  
 
The purpose of CIMIC is twofold: 
 
“The immediate purpose of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full co-operation of the 
NATO commander and the civilian authorities, organisations, agencies and population within a 
commander’s area of operations in order to allow him to fulfil his mission…The long-term 
purpose of CIMIC is to help create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of 
Alliance objectives in operations” (MC 411/1, article 9). 
                                                 
27 Interview 23 August, 2005 
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According to AJP-9 (article 103-1) CIMIC is applicable to both Article 5 Collective 
Defence Operations and non Article 5 CROs. The context and profile of CIMIC will be 
different depending on the nature of the crisis or operation. In Article 5 operations the 
focus of CIMIC is likely to be narrower than in a non Article 5 operation where the focus 
of CIMIC is expected to be broader and more complex.  
 
CIMIC has three core functions (AJP-9, article 104-1). The first is civil-military liaison. 
The purpose is to provide the coordination necessary to facilitate and support the planning 
and conduct of operations. Civil-military liaison is being established at the political, 
strategic and operational levels with the civilian component. Liaison is the most important 
core function. It implies that connections are being established through the creation of 
structures and channels for communication. The second core function is support to the 
civil environment. This core function covers a number of CIMIC activities, and may 
involve a range of military resources, such as information, personnel, materiel, 
equipment, communications facilities, specialist expertise or training. AJP-9 article 104-
1-b continues to state that “It will generally only take place where and when it is required 
to create conditions necessary for the fulfilment of the military mission and/or because the 
appropriate civil authorities and agencies are unable to carry out the task.” The third core 
function is support to the force, acknowledging that NATO commanders to varying 
degrees will be dependent on different kinds of civilian support from within the 
operational theatre such as civilian resources, information, and tacit civilian support for 
the operations. CIMIC plays an essential role in obtaining such support.  
 
According to AJP-9 article 203 a number of principles govern the civil-military 
relationship. The first principle is cultural awareness. This implies that the military must 
seek a sound understanding of local culture, customs and laws. The second principle 
underlines that common objectives shared by NATO forces and civilian organizations 
should wherever possible be established and recognised. Thirdly the analysis of common 
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objectives should lead to an agreed sharing of responsibilities. The fourth principle 
governing civil-military relations is that every effort should be made to secure consent, 
which is the willing cooperation of civilian organizations. The fifth principle is that 
CIMIC tasks and activities should be transparent, and the last principle underscores the 
essence of maintaining open and constant communication.  
 
MC 411/1 article 11 underlines that the military will normally only be responsible for 
security related tasks and for support to the appropriate civil authority. It is only in 
exceptional circumstances that the military may be required to take on tasks normally the 
responsibility of a mandated civil authority, organization or agency. These tasks are only 
to be assumed by the military if an otherwise unacceptable vacuum would arise. The 
responsibility for such civil related tasks will be handed over to the appropriate civil 
authority of agency as soon as possible and in a smooth a manner as possible.  
 
CIMIC Coordination Centres (CCC) are an important part of the CIMIC concept. 
According to AJP-9 article 502.2 the key functions of CCCs are to a) Provide initial 
points of contact; b) Provide a focal point for liaison; c) Facilitate information exchange; 
d) Provide advice on the availability and mechanics of military assistance to civilian 
organisations; and e) Re-enforce the legitimacy of the Force in the eyes of civil authorities 
and the local population.  
 
A useful exercise could be to sort out what CIMIC is not (Rollins 2001:123). CIMIC is 
not military assistance to civil authorities. This kind of assistance is usually given in 
connection with natural disasters and the like. Nor is CIMIC civil emergency planning, 
which primarily concerns the protection of civilian populations. CIMIC is not civil affairs 
(CA). CA is an American construct which I will elaborate on in section 4.2.4. Last, but 
not least, CIMIC is not “nation building”, as this is the domain of the international 
community and NATO per definition does not engage in “nation building”.   
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4.2.2 The UN 
 
One main difference between a NATO operation and a UN peace operation is that in 
addition to a military force and/or observer component, a UN peace operation will always 
have a political or diplomatic authority. In most cases this function will be filled by the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). A NATO operation has no 
political authority at the operational level, and hence the military commanders are to 
directly establish contact with the civilian agents. The SRSG will seek to harmonize the 
operational objectives of the political, military and humanitarian components of the 
mission (Hatzenbichler 2001:117-118). The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) defines Civil Military Coordination as follows:  
 
“UN Civil-Military Coordination is the system of interaction, involving exchanges of 
information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support, and planning at all levels between 
military elements and humanitarian organizations, development organizations, or the local 
civilian population, to achieve respective objectives” (DPKO 2000, article 8). 
 
A source of some confusion is the fact that the UN has developed two definitions of civil-
military coordination. The other definition originates from the Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).The definition for UN Humanitarian Civil-Military 
Coordination (CMCoord) is: 
 
 “The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian 
emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, 
minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from 
coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and 
common training” (OCHA 2003: 5). 
 
In the literature both definitions are referred to as the UN CIMIC doctrine. The DPKO 
definition defines the civilian component more in line with the NATO doctrine, though 
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leaving out the local authorities. This is perhaps due to the SRSG function described 
above. The OCHA definition seemingly limits the civilian component to humanitarian 
actors. Whilst the NATO definition stress the military mission, the DPKO UN definition 
emphasise civil-military cooperation as a concept and a mechanism to create a common 
understanding and a proper point of departure to reach both military and civilian goals 
(Jensen 2003:10). Whilst the DPKO definition focuses on “respective objectives”, OCHA 
CIMIC opens for pursuing common goals. The UN wording, “Civil-military 
Coordination”, is not random. According to the IASC28 reference paper (2004:7): “… 
cooperation – the closer form of coordination – with belligerent forces should in principle 
not take place, unless in extreme and exceptional circumstances and as a last resort.” 
 
4.2.3 The EU 
 
In 2003 the European Council approved the European security strategy “A Secure Europe 
in a Better World.” The security strategy states that (2003:7) “In contrast to the massive 
visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be 
tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments.” The EU has 
worked to establish a crisis-management capability to be part of its Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) for a long period of time. According to Whitepaper 39 (2003-
2004, article 6.4) it has been a main goal for the EU to secure a comprehensive approach 
to crisis-management, e.g. by developing both civilian and military tools. The EU was 
ready to lead civil and military crisis-management operations in 2003. EU CIMIC is 
defined as: 
 
“Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the 
mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations and civil actors 
                                                 
28 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) was grounded in 1992 in response to the General Assembly 
Resolution 46/182 calling for strengthened coordination of humanitarian assistance 
(www.humanitarianinfo/org/iasc/) 
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(external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, 
national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.”29 
 
The wording of the EU CIMIC definition is essentially equal to the NATO definition, and 
stresses that the CIMIC functions should be executed in support of the EU military 
mission.  
 
4.2.4 U.S. and U.K. Civil-Military Operations 
 
Civil-military operations (CMO) are the equivalent to NATO CIMIC in U.S. and U.K. 
doctrine. The related concepts of civil affairs, civil affairs activities and civil-military 
operations are defined as follows by the U.S. Department of Defense: 
 
Civil Affairs: “Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, 
and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military 
operations.”  
 
Civil Affairs activities: “Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the 
relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are 
present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally 
the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations.”  
 
Civil-military operations: “The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or 
exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian 
organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile 
operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational 
                                                 
29http://ares.apan-
info.net/QuickPlace/te8reliefweb/Main.nsf/$defaultview/ABB1BCF8C0FE86AC0A256EBD00011724/$File/Glossar
y%20CMCoord.pdf?OpenElement (read 24 July, 2005) 
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US objectives… Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other 
military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.”30 
 
As pointed out by Rana (2004:572) the scope of the U.S. CA doctrine differs from the 
CIMIC doctrine of NATO. NATO perceive CIMIC as a function to improve coordination 
with the civilian component, and the NATO CIMIC doctrine is not project-oriented, yet 
does not rule out the possibility of CIMIC conducting humanitarian projects provided 
they support the military mission. The CA approach of the U.S. seems inclined to 
influence the civilian environment in support of their armed forces. CMO’s may 
substitute for civilian authorities and organizations. According to one CIMIC-officer 
“CIMIC does not equal British CA. CA implies adjusting the civil society to the needs of 
the force, that is to manipulate the civil society in good colonial tradition.”31 
 
In the literature there seem to be a general confusion of CA and CMO. CA is according to 
the definition designated personnel, whilst CMO is what they perform. The U.S. CMO 
definition also states that forces other than CA can conduct CMO.  
 
According to one CIMIC-officer also Norway has employed the concept of CMO in 
previous operations. The officer actually prefers this label, as it implies an operational 
intent.32  
 
4.3 The civilian component in a peace support operation 
 
There are several categorizations of the civilian actors in a peace support operation. AJP-9 
(chapter 8) suggests three principal types of civilian organizations compromising the 
civilian humanitarian sector. According to the doctrine (article 801), “It is critical that 
                                                 
30 Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Chiefs of Staff Library (read 26 
July 2005): http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html 
31 Interview 1 June, 2005 
32 Interview 13 May, 2005 
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CIMIC personnel fully understand the mandate, role, structure, methods and principles of 
these organisations to establish an effective relationship with them.” The first group are 
International Organizations (IOs) established by intergovernmental agreements such as 
the various UN organisations and the OSCE. The International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) also belongs to this group.33 The second group consist of Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), which are voluntary organisations with their own 
charters and missions. International and National Donor Agencies also belong to this 
group. The third group is called “other groupings” which is perceived to be within the 
above generic types. It consists of agencies such as Civilian Development Agencies and 
Human Rights and Democratisation Agencies.    
 
Greve and Hertzeberg (2001:12) also include the civilian population and local and 
regional authorities when they classify civilian actors. When speaking about civilian 
actors or the civilian component, it is vital to include these two groups, but when we are 
talking about the civilian humanitarian sector these groups should be left out. Hence the 
civilian component is made up of three groups, the civilian humanitarian sector, the 
civilian population and local authorities. CIMIC is instrumental in dealing with all these 
groups.  
 
The civilian population may be divided into several ethnic groups, some defined as part of 
the conflict, other as victims. The local or regional authorities may be comprised of 
politicians, the police, religious leaders, the public administration etc. It is crucial to 
recognize that each conflict is unique, and the civilian component will differ exceedingly 
from conflict to conflict.  
 
 
                                                 
33 The ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organisation, having a unique status as it fulfils the role 
conferred upon it by the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Additional Protocols of 1977 and the Statues of the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement adopted in 1986. 
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4.4 CIMIC in the civilian-military interface 
 
The civilian humanitarian sector has often been reluctant to collaborate with the military 
component. Lia and Hansen (1998:28) label this “a clash of cultures”. They stress the 
existence of a number of objections, mutual prejudices and stereotypes due to dissimilar 
organizational cultures and operating procedures, different identities, different time 
horizons and differences in composition when it comes to gender. The military puts 
emphasis on structure, order and hierarchy, discipline and clear lines of command. The 
civil humanitarian sector may be distinguished by an informal, improvised and egalitarian 
organizational structure (ibid). The civilian humanitarian sector fears that civil-military 
collaboration will compromise their impartiality, neutrality and independence. A CIMIC-
officer quotes some general stereotypes in the NGO conception of the military: ““boys 
with toys”, rigid, authoritarian, conservative, impatient, arrogant, civilian-phobic, 
excessively security minded”, and stereotypes in the military about NGOs: “Non-guided 
organisations, left-wing children of the 60s, useless do-gooders, undisciplined, 
unpunctual, anarchic, self-righteous, and usually anti-military.”34 Stene (2005:75) does 
not validate the existence of such stereotypes in her study, but still finds that there are 
traceable misconceptions due to the fact that conflicts justify the existence of both players 
in a given operational theatre, giving rise to scepticism. Stene further stresses the need for 
and necessity of increased understanding of the respective roles and mandates of civilian 
and military players. The interdependent character of civil-military cooperation underlines 
this need (MC 411/1, article 1). 
  
The international response to conflicts usually involves a sequence of short and long term 
stabilization efforts. Figure 4.1 (Rollins 2001:124) depicts what the military should do on 
the top half, and what the mandated civilian actors, such as the examples illustrated, 
should do at the bottom. This is the ideal division of labour. The reality has proven very 
different and the military have been involved in all activities at the bottom half.  
                                                 
34 Interview 5 August, 2005 
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Figure 4.1 Task relationships between NATO and the civilian organizations – the ideal 
 
Accepting that the military level of involvement in reality does not follow the ideal 
depicted in figure 4.1, new challenges arises as to how far the level of involvement should 
go and which procedures should govern it (Rollins 2001:124). Figure 4.2 is a simplistic 
representation of the correlation of civil and military involvement in civil-related 
activities (Jensen 2003:21):  
 
  
Figure 4.2 CIMIC transition 
 
At the beginning, the military forces are involved in wide range of civilian tasks. As the 
civilian players increasingly take on them the civil-related activities, a corresponding 
decline in military involvement should occur. The interception will be the point where the 
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“transition” of responsibilities takes place. The military are perceived to be taking on 
civilian tasks in order to fill a vacuum, and the civilian actors are intended to take them 
over as soon as possible. In reality, the transition to the civilian component is much less 
smooth than the figure suggests, and the military are usually engaged in civil-related 
matters much longer than anticipated. Transition to civil control is a key component for 
reaching the end-state of a PSO.  
 
4.5 Norwegian CIMIC 
 
According to Greve and Hertzeberg (2001:11) the Norwegian armed forces had its first 
serious encounter with CIMIC in IFOR, operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the period 
1995-1996. Before IFOR Norwegian procedure had been to have a humanitarian/judicial 
adviser in the Norwegian battalions. Lia and Hansen wrote in 1997 (51-52)  that CIMIC 
was not institutionalized in Norway, despite the existence of working groups and forums 
and an improvement of the informal and formal cooperation between the Norwegian 
armed forces and humanitarian organizations. Greve and Hertzeberg (2001:21) conclude 
that “Our inquiries have not established whether the Norwegian government have any 
kind of vision, intention, policy or goal for civil-military cooperation in a peace support 
operation. The political agenda seems to be missing.” Seemingly Ruset (2001:107) 
supports this conclusion: 
  
“Despite increased emphasis on international operations and a general acceptance at political and 
military professional levels of the importance of civil-military cooperation in international 
operations, this is not reflected in the Norwegian approach to such operations. Lacking statistical 
evidence, I will claim that Norwegian (civil and military) efforts in the Balkans are not co-
ordinated” 
 
Nissen (2002) focus on the understanding of CIMIC among Norwegian military 
personnel. He (2002:73) expected the Norwegian armed forces, due to its experiences 
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from traditional peacekeeping and the alleged emphasis on consent, to be in the forefront 
regarding CIMIC. His expectation was only to some extent. He points to the lack of 
CIMIC-courses at the Military Academy and the Joint Staff College, the lack of extensive 
experience with Norwegian officers performing CIMIC functions in Kosovo, 
unsatisfactory lectures and training and the lack of written guidelines and handbooks. 
CIMIC turned out to be quite unfamiliar terrain to Norwegian military personnel serving 
in Kosovo. Nissen (2002:74) concludes that “In general it seemed to be no common 
understanding of the concept among Norwegian personnel.”  
 
As the doctrinal work and CIMIC-focus accelerated in NATO, nations were encouraged 
to establish CIMIC units as mentioned before. Norway made a commitment to establish a 
CIMIC unit operational as of 1 January, 2003, and agreed to be a part of CIMIC Group 
North (CGN). The Norwegian CIMIC unit consists of three CIMIC elements, and belongs 
administratively to the army’s reaction force. All elements have 16 CIMIC-officers on 
readiness-contracts signed for a period of two to three years, in addition to a leading 
element consisting of four CIMIC-officers. This amounts to 52 officers on contracts ready 
to deploy in 30 days. Consequently the armed forces have CIMIC officers prepared at any 
time for deployment to international operations such as the ones in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 
The CIMIC unit was originally lead by a lieutenant-colonel and established as a section at 
the Norwegian Defence Staff College (NODSC).35 The daily work was run by four 
lieutenant-colonels and a civilian. They taught CIMIC at the NODSC, and functioned as a 
centre for CIMIC competence (Kvam 2002:14). Due to the reorganization of the NODSC 
the CIMIC section there has been closed down, with only one CIMIC position remaining. 
The CIMIC positions have been moved to other parts of the military organization such as 
the army’s transformation- and doctrine-command (TRADOK).36   
 
                                                 
35 Forsvarets Stabsskole (FSTS) 
36 Interview 6 April, 2005 
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In the middle of 1999 the Netherlands suggested to establish a CIMIC Group North 
(CGN) aiming at coordinating and leading the many national CIMIC units in future 
operations. Germany agreed to this suggestion, and together they invited NATO countries 
in the northern region to establish a CGN. U.K. turned the invitation down, as they had 
been asked to establish an Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) 
CIMIC Group. Island and Luxembourg also turned the offer down, whilst Belgium agreed 
to a limited participation. The consequent members of CGN are the Netherlands, 
Germany, Poland, Norway, the Czech Republic and Denmark. Italy was in charge of the 
establishment of a CIMIC Group South. CGN was subsequently established in September 
2001. The CGN headquarter (HQ CGN) is located in the Dutch city of Budel.37 In 
January 2003 CGN formally received its status as a NATO International Military 
Headquarters. It is functionally attached to Regional Headquarters Allied Forces North 
Europe (RHQ AFNORTH). CGN will provide NATO Commanders with a co-ordinated 
approach to civil-military expertise.38 
 
4.6 The intervention in Afghanistan and Norwegian engagement 
 
The Norwegian military engagement in Afghanistan must be seen in connection with the 
civilian contributions Norway has provided to the country. But before elaborating on this 
I will briefly present the historical background for the international community’s 
intervention in Afghanistan.   
 
4.6.1 Brief historical background 
 
The 11th of September 2001 New York and Washington were hit by terrorism on a 
horrifying scale. The war-like theatres consequently unfolding in the economic and 
                                                 
37 CGN elaboration by SSO, 23 September, 2005 
38 Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) (read 25 September, 2005): http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/cimic.htm  
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military centres of the superpower suggested the entrance of a new age of terrorism, 
ending the period labelled the post-Cold War era. Leaders from around the world were 
unified in denouncing the attacks against the United States and in offering their support.  
 
The investigation soon pointed to the Saudi-born dissident Osama Bin Laden and his al-
Qaeda organisation. President Bush acknowledged that “This will be a different kind of 
conflict against a different kind of enemy.” He continued to assert that “Victory against 
terrorism will not take place in a single battle, but in a series of decisive actions against 
terrorist organizations and those who harbor and support them.”39 International attention 
was directed towards Afghanistan and its Taliban government suspected of hiding leaders 
of al-Qaeda and constituting a hotbed for terrorists. The demands presented by President 
Bush were non-negotiable. He called for immediate action, and asserted that the Taliban 
must “…hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate”.40 Afghanistan was 
labelled a “failed state” and regarded as a potential safe haven for drug production and 
terrorists.  
 
The international community was unified in its purpose towards Afghanistan. “The 
government fully supports the US-led military operations against the terror network in 
Afghanistan. It is now clear that Afghanistan is a base for a network of terror operations. 
Consequently the use of military power is necessary.” These are the words of the 
Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg on 7 October, 2001, the initiation day of the 
campaign in Afghanistan.41 The MoD official in my interview material emphasised the 
fact that the Norwegian participation in Afghanistan was uncontroversial and supported 
by a majority in parliament.42  
 
                                                 
39 Radio Address of the President to the Nation (read 28 January, 2004): 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010915.html 
40 Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (read 28 January, 2004): 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html 
41 Press release nr.: 186/2001 (read 28 March, 2004): 
http://odin.dep.no/odinarkiv/norsk/dep/smk/2001/pressem/001001-070394/index-dok000-b-n-a.html 
42 Interview 20 May, 2005 
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Afghanistan is located in Southern Asia, bordering on China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 84% of the approximately 28,700,000 inhabitants are 
Sunni Muslim.43 Afghanistan is a landlocked country in extreme poverty, and a society 
that has seen many conflicts. The terrible conflict of most recent times began in 1979. A 
civil war triggered a Soviet intervention aiming at installing a Soviet-friendly regime. The 
Soviet military occupation lasted until 1989, pitting Western backed Islamic rebels 
against the Soviet forces and their local allies. Anti-Communist mujahedin forces with 
foreign training and supplies eventually forced a Soviet withdrawal. Losing its unifying 
force the Islamic forces split into several factions and continued to fight among 
themselves. By 1996 the Taliban had won control of the capital, Kabul, but the country 
was still in a state of war. In October 2001 the Afghan crisis took a new turn. The 
Taliban’s refusal to surrender Osama bin Laden to the U.S. resulted in the formation of a 
U.S.-led international coalition. The Taliban was ousted from power on 17 November 
2001 after several weeks of bombardment and military action on the ground by coalition 
forces.44  
 
On 5 December 2001 the Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending 
the re-establishment of permanent government institutions, know as the Bonn Agreement, 
was signed. The second part of the Bonn Agreement states that an Interim Authority 
should be established in December 2001 (article I.1). Subsequently the agreement 
prescribed an Emergency Loya Jirga to be convened, and to decide on a Transitional 
Authority to lead Afghanistan “…until such time as a fully representative government can 
be elected through free and fair elections to be held no later than two years from the date 
of the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga” (article I.4). The agreement further 
prescribes that “A Constitutional Loya Jirga shall be convened within eighteen months of 
the establishment of the Transitional Authority, in order to adopt a new constitution for 
                                                 
43 CIA-The World Factbook (read 18 March, 2004): 
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/af.html 
44 Global Policy Forum: Afghanistan (read 22 March, 2004): 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/afgindx.htm 
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Afghanistan” (article I.6). The Emergency Loya Jirga took place in Kabul from 15 to 22 
June 2002. The Transitional Authority was established, a constitution was drafted and a 
Constitutional Loya Jirga convened in mid-December 2003 (Suhrke et al. 2004:27). In 
January the new Constitution was signed, and in October 2004 Hamid Karzai was elected 
President of Afghanistan45. Afghanistan held its first parliamentary elections in 
September 2005.  
 
The G-8 countries have initiated a series of programmes within Security Sector Reforms. 
”Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration” (DDR) of the previous Afghan Army 
is lead by Japan. The U.K. is in charge of an anti-narcotics programme, reconstruction of 
the Afghan Army is lead by the U.S. and reconstruction of the police force is lead by 
Germany. Italy is in charge of the revision and reconstruction of the juridical sector. 
According to Nermo (2005:11) the programmes have varied in their progression, where 
the DDR process and the reconstruction of the Army is progressing the most, whilst the 
development of the juridical sector seems to be lagging behind.  
 
4.6.2 The military engagement in Afghanistan 
 
Afghanistan was confirmed as a top-priority of NATO on the NATO summit in Istanbul 
in June 2004. Afghanistan is also a main priority for Norwegian military commitments 
abroad. All branches in the Norwegian armed forces have committed forces to 
Afghanistan, in addition to joint capacities. Seemingly, the Norwegian military 
contributions to Afghanistan contain two extremes. Norway has contributed with forces to 
the American-lead peace enforcement operation called Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF), as part of the war against terror. At the same time Norway has committed forces to 
the peacekeeping operation of ISAF, which is a stabilisation force part of the efforts to 
“win the peace”. According to Leerand (2003:18) this is no contradiction, but rather two 
                                                 
45 CIA-The World Factbook (ibid) 
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sides of the same story. Peace and progress presupposes the absence of terror and 
insecurity.    
 
4.6.2.1 Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF 
 
The military phase of the war against terror began on 7 October, 2001, and the operation 
was named Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).46 U.S. and British forces launched air 
strikes against Afghan targets striving to overthrow Taliban and wreck the al-Qaeda 
network. The initial military objectives included the destruction of terrorist training camps 
and infrastructure, the capture of al-Qaeda leaders and the termination of terrorist 
activities in Afghanistan.47 In the south eastern region of the country the U.S. lead 
coalition are at the time of writing still engaged in a war against alleged terrorists and 
Taliban remnants. Norwegian military resources were soon offered. “Our own security is 
close and inextricably linked to the outcome of the fight against international terrorism. 
Therefore we must be prepared to take our share of the military burdens” stated the 
Minister of Defence, Kristin Krohn Devold.48  
 
The Norwegian force contribution to OEF included Special Forces, with special capacities 
such as undertaking operations in hard winter conditions. Norway also contributed with 
mine clearing and one Hercules C – 130 transport aircraft with personnel. The first phase 
of the Norwegian contributions to OEF was finalised in the summer of 2002.49 The 
transport aircraft contribution was terminated in October 2002, the same month as 
Norway contributed with six F-16 jet fighters to be stationed on the base in Manas, 
                                                 
46 One CIMIC-officer emphasize that the UNSC mandate constitutes the main difference between OEF and ISAF 
(interview 1 June, 2005). Whether OEF was authorized by UNSC resolution 1368 and article 51 in the UN Charter is 
subjected to continued disputes.  
47 Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (ibid) 
48 Press release nr.: 062/2001 (read 11 February, 2004): 
http://odin.dep.no/fd/norsk/aktuelt/pressem/010011-070134/index-dok000-b-n-a.html 
49 MoD: “Norske bidrag i Afghanistan – status 1. juli 2002” (read 11 February, 2004): 
http://www.odin.dep.no/fd/norsk/publ/veiledninger/010011-120039/index-dok000-b-n-a.html 
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Kyrgyzstan. Norway cooperated with Denmark and the Netherlands with the main 
mission of supporting OEF field operations. The mission was terminated in April 2003.50 
By the autumn of 2003, Norway had shifted focus from the U.S.-led OEF to the 
international stabilisation force, ISAF. The main impetus for this was probably the NATO 
takeover of ISAF command in August 2003.  
 
4.6.2.2 International Security and Assistance Force, ISAF 
 
In accordance with the Bonn Agreement, the UNSC passed a resolution on 20 December, 
2001 authorizing the deployment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to 
Kabul and its surrounding areas.51 ISAF is not a UN force, but a coalition of the willing. 
Initially the leadership of ISAF was rotational every sixth month. The first ISAF mission 
was lead by the U.K., the second by Turkey, and the third ISAF mission was run by 
Germany and the Netherlands with support from NATO. NATO assumed the ISAF 
leadership in August 2003. This commitment was a watershed in NATO history, being its 
first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area. In October 2003 UNSC resolution 1510 
provided for the “…progressive expansion of the International Security and Assistance 
Force to other urban centres and other areas beyond Kabul.” This was a long-sought 
extension. ISAF's aim is to assist the Government of Afghanistan in maintaining security 
within its area of operation. ISAF supports the Government of Afghanistan in expanding 
its authority to the rest of the country, and in providing a safe and secure environment. 
ISAF currently numbers around 8,000 troops from 36 NATO, nine partner and two non-
NATO / non-partner countries.52 
 
                                                 
50 MoD: “Status norske bidrag til “Enduring Freesdom” og ISAF” (read 11 February, 2004): 
http://www.odin.dep.no/fd/norsk/aktuelt/nyheter/010011-210120/index-dok000-b-n-a.html 
51 S/RES/1386 (2001) 
52 NATO in Afghanistan Factsheet (read 25 September, 2005): 
  http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm  
 
     
 65
Norway was one of 16 signatories to the agreement on ISAF in January, 2002. Norway’s 
initial military contribution to ISAF in early 2002 was modest compared to the OEF 
contributions. The contribution included a transport control (MOVCON) team and an 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team. The EOD team cleared mines and 
undetonated explosives in Kabul and its surrounding areas. The MOVCON team was 
stationed on the Kabul airport and provided certain ground functions.53 In February 2003 
Norway had deployed a CIMIC element, by August the same year a surgical hospital unit, 
and by November a guard and security company functioning as a rapid reaction force, 
Telemark Task Force I (TTF I).54 The surgical hospital unit was first and foremost an 
emergency hospital for ISAF, but also treated local patients when possible. TTF I 
contributed to securing the implementation of the Loja Jirga process. In March 2004 TTF 
I was replaced by TTF II. TTF II was replaced by the Norwegian Squadron (NorSqn) 
which is part of Battle Group 3 (BG 3) under Norwegian leadership. Simultaneously 
Norway made a contribution to a British-lead PRT originally part of the OEF but later 
transferred to ISAF.  
Figure 
4.3 Norwegian force contributions and number of personnel deployed to Afghanistan55  
                                                 
53 Pressrelease MoD Nr. 066/2001 (read 11 February 2004): 
http://www.odin.dep.no/fd/norsk/aktuell/pressem/010011-070138/index-dok000-b-f-a.html 
54 MoD: “Status norske bidrag til “Enduring Freedom” og ISAF” (ibid) 
55 Figure from Hærfra nr. 6 June 2004: 2, reprinted with permission 
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4.6.3 The civilian and humanitarian engagement in Afghanistan 
 
In combination with the military commitments, Norway upgraded its humanitarian 
engagement, gradually focusing on long-term forms of assistance. In 2004 Afghanistan 
was designated as one of Norway’s development “partner countries” (Suhrke et al. 
2004:55). Norwegian NGOs have been engaged with Afghanistan since the 1980s. In 
September 2001 only the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee and Norwegian Church Aid 
were present in Afghanistan. During 2002, the Norwegian Refugee Council and Save the 
Children Norway established themselves in Kabul (Suhrke et al. 2004:59). According to 
Stene (2005:34) an estimated 1600 NGOs operate in Afghanistan, of which 1200 are 
registered. 
 
When the Taliban rule collapsed the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Kabul was established, 
formally attached to the embassy in Islamabad and consequently with a charge’d affairs. 
In 2004 the embassy was upgraded due to the establishment of the Embassy of Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan in Oslo. The Afghan embassy in Oslo is responsible for the 
entire Scandinavia, and accordingly non-resident to Denmark, Sweden, Finland and 
Iceland. The Norwegian embassy in Kabul had regular contact both with the Norwegian 
humanitarian environment and with CIMIC personnel. They arranged meetings once a 
month where two from each NGO were invited to join, in addition to the armed forces. 
On those monthly meetings the embassy’s security-assessments were presented.56    
 
As of 2004 Norway has also been participating with a police contingent to Afghanistan. 
The contingent consists of as up to ten police officers, and is part of Civilian Police, 
CivPol. The police officers participate in a German-lead training-project at the police 
school in Kabul.57   
 
                                                 
56 Interview 16 June, 2005 
57 The reader is referred to www.politi.no 
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4.6.3.1 UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA 
 
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA, was established on 28 
March 2002, by UNSC resolution 1401.58 UNAMA was established to integrate the 
activities of the UN agencies operating in Afghanistan. UNAMA’s mandate is to promote 
national reconciliation, to implement the UN responsibilities stated in the Bonn 
Agreement, and to manage all UN humanitarian, relief, recovery and reconstruction 
activities in Afghanistan. It is led by the SRSG, whose authority over the planning and 
conduct of all UN activities in Afghanistan is reaffirmed in resolution 1401. Ambassador 
Lakhdar Brahimi was appointed as SRSG for Afghanistan on 3 October 2001. Brahimi 
ended his tenure as SRSG in 2004. He was succeeded by Jean Arnault.59 
 
4.7 Norwegian CIMIC in Afghanistan 
 
Countries report possible force contributions to NATO’s force register. On NATO 
Manning Conferences nations bid on which force contributions they wish to contribute 
with to a particular military operation. From the end of the 1990s CIMIC was a prioritised 
area, and the MoD perceived it as favourable to use that capacity. Hence an informal offer 
was given to NATO, which was accepted in the autumn of 2002. The MoD was 
responsible for identifying and assigning the CIMIC-contribution to ISAF, in addition to 
the superior CIMIC policy and the dialogue with the MFA on CIMIC projects. The MoD 
in collaboration with MFA developed policy for co-function between civilian and military 
efforts in conflict areas. The Norwegian Defence Staff and the National Joint 
                                                 
58 S/RES/1401 (2002) 
59 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: About UNAMA  (read 25 March, 2004):  
http://www.unama-afg.org/about/index.html 
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Headquarters (FOHK) were responsible for the implementation of CIMIC in Afghanistan. 
MFA provided financing and project-approval during the CIMIC deployment.60  
 
During the one-year period of the Norwegian CIMIC-deployment several countries 
committed CIMIC contributions to ISAF. Finland and Sweden were the greatest 
contributors, with six teams each. Norway and Germany had two teams, the British one 
team and in addition Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Turkey deployed CIMIC teams 
during the one-year period61. Furthermore many contingencies had CIMIC integrated as 
part of their force, then usually liaison-officers or CIMIC-officers. 
 
Norwegian CIMIC had three rotations, and accordingly each element was deployed for a 
period of four months. Each element consisted of two CIMIC teams with six persons in 
each team, in addition to a commanding officer and an administration officer. Half of the 
officers were regular army professionals, whilst the rest were reserve-officers with 
civilian occupations. CIMIC element one and two had female officers, whilst element 
three did not. The Norwegian CIMIC teams lived in the engineer camp of ISAF Kabul 
Multinational Brigade (KMB), Camp Framheim. Other Norwegian force contributions 
stayed in the same camp before, during and after the CIMIC deployment.  
 
The Norwegian CIMIC teams were responsible for two districts in the north-western part 
of Kabul, Mir Bacha Kot and Shakadara. Mir Bacha Kot had approximately 100 000 
inhabitants, whilst Shakadara had approximately 140 000. The front line between the 
Taliban regime and the Northern Alliance had gone through these districts, causing 
massive destructions (Løvhaug2004). During the Soviet occupation in the 1980’s the 
Shomali plain62 was a free target range for the Soviet Air Force, and the roads between 
Baghram Airport and Kabul was regularly attacked by mujahedin guerrillas. The age old 
                                                 
60 This section is based on interview 20 May, 2005 and e-mail correspondence with MoD official 13 May, 2005 and 
20 July, 2005 
61 Interview 6 April, 2005 
62 The Shomali plain is a plateau north of Kabul, which was an enormous battleground during decades of war. The 
district Mir Bacha Kot is part of this plateau.  
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“qanat” underground water reservoirs were used as arms caches and refuge for the 
guerrillas, and the destruction of this infrastructure had caused a severe setback for 
agriculture in these districts. The physical infrastructure was mirrored by the social 
organization which was also in tatters, and the setback for transferring inherent traditional 
knowledge was severe. A local boycott of the communist curriculum had caused the 
destruction of village schools by authorities, and a reciprocal guerrilla bombing campaign 
against schools teaching the loyalist/regime agenda. These tactics resulted in the area 
having no primary schooling facilities for almost two decades, making water and 
education obvious priorities to restore civil society.63 Geographically the districts were not 
extensive, but the density of people was high as there often lived ten people in every 
house. Mir Bacha Kot had approximately 30 villages, Shakadara about 40, and each of 
these had a “malik”, a local village-chief.64 
 
A “regular day” for the Norwegian CIMIC teams, to the degree that such a day in fact 
existed, would start with a morning brief on what task was to be carried out during the 
day. Then the teams would drive to the villages, usually with no appointment in advance 
due to security concerns. They would contact the district governors, civilian 
administrations or a “malik” with a needs-assessment interview form covering the water 
situation, health, education, nutrition, electricity and so on. According to the officers there 
was a lot of contact with civilians, and it took quite some time to cover all the villages. 
The CIMIC teams also talked with people in the streets, and handed out the ISAF-
newspaper. When returning to camp patrol reports were made. The purpose was to form a 
correct and total picture of the situation in the districts and to map the local needs. The 
reports were delivered to the CIMIC Coordination Centre (CCC). Consequently the CCC 
would be able to assess where the needs were greatest.   
 
                                                 
63 Elaborated by CIMIC officer in e-mail 11 October, 2005 
64 Interview 6 April, 2005  
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After a period of time the Norwegian CIMIC teams were increasingly preoccupied with 
projects. The projects were financed by the budget for humanitarian activities in the 
MFA, from which the Norwegian CIMIC had been granted five million NOK. All 
projects needed approval from the MFA. In reality this meant approval from the embassy 
in Kabul, which received all project proposals and cost calculations. The embassy would 
send it to MFA, but usually, if the project was approved by the embassy, it would also be 
approved by the MFA. The embassy diplomat65 stated that what happened at the MFA 
was a formality, and that the MFA followed the embassy’s recommendations in all cases 
to his recollection. 90 percent of the project applications were smoothly approved, whilst 
with the last ten percent CIMIC was asked to revise the application, or it was 
recommended by the embassy with certain comments/recommendations. The MoD and 
the MFA had drawn up some criteria on which projects were to be launched. Amongst 
these were school, education, health and small infrastructure-programmes. Approval 
implied that the project was thematically placed within this frame. When a project had 
been approved a regular bidding was initiated, where entrepreneur firms were invited to 
give estimates. CCC would function as a project organization making the specifications, 
deals, contracts etc., and then it was mostly the CIMIC teams who followed up on the 
projects. It was a demand that if unskilled labour was to be used, the local villages would 
benefit by providing labour.  
 
During the one-year period the Norwegian CIMIC unit carried out a number of projects, 
such as the building of five schools, establishing medical clinics and female dressmaker 
workshops, donations of school material and medical supplies, building wells and 
restoring qanat water arteries, establishing a patient-shuttle from the villages to the 
Norwegian and Dutch surgical hospital units in Kabul, water supplies and vaccinating 
cattle. One CIMIC officer emphasised that the village population’s possibility to have 
water for their farmland was of immediate vital concern, in order to sustain further 
refugee return. Drought, erosion, and the influential social strata’s deep drilling for water 
                                                 
65 Interview 16 June, 2005 
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were counterproductive in this respect. However, the restoration of the qanat system was 
work intensive as opposed to the capital intensive deep drilling. The hand on approach of 
CIMIC was of importance to attain local sentiment in regard to i.e. certain ethnic groups 
being prioritized by the local powers.66 
   
A Norwegian CIMIC element was among 18 elements belonging to the CIMIC 
Coordination Centre and Finnish-lead CJ9 structure.67 Liaison-officers (LNOs) integrated 
into national contingencies were commanded by CJ9, but did not necessarily report to the 
CCC. Germany, Italy and the U.K. were disentangled from this structure, and not 
coordinated by the ISAF system. This created major problems for the CJ9 and CCC 
structure. One CIMIC-officer labelled the German, Italian and British CIMIC “national 
CIMIC” elements, and hints to them being very close to “military NGOs.”68 The 18 ISAF 
CIMIC elements had meetings in the CCC every day, whilst the “national CIMIC” 
elements were invited to weekly meetings where participation was voluntary.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 Elaborated by CIMIC officer in e-mail 11 October, 2005 
67 Combined Joint 9: Head of the branch within a military staff responsible for handling civil/military matters and 
being the Military Commanders adviser in these matters (CIMIC-officer in e-mail correspondence 23 October, 2005) 
68 Interview 23 August, 2005 
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Part 4: Analysis 
 
 
5. Prior to deployment: The Norwegian decision to contribute 
with a civil-military cooperation unit to Afghanistan 
 
5.1 The impact of rational and strategic imperatives 
 
To investigate the Norwegian decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan in 
a rationalist light I will discuss how national security-policy interests at the political-
strategic level and the central military-strategic objectives identified in the 
methodological chapter influenced the decision. The hypothesis claims that H 1: To 
contribute with a civil-military cooperation unit to Afghanistan was a rational course of 
action maximizing Norwegian security-policy interests and military-strategic objectives.  
 
5.1.1 The political-strategic level 
 
In the methodological chapter I suggested that two Norwegian security-policy interests 
would influence the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan. The first 
interest was to secure continued NATO relevance, which is a stated Norwegian goal and 
essential to Norwegian security. Frantzen (2005:3) claims that “To what extent national 
policy adapts to Alliance policy is in part dependent on the power relations within the 
Alliance.” The small state status of Norway and the desire to secure the relevance of 
NATO makes Norway more receptive to Alliance policy. NATO has accelerated its focus 
on CIMIC since the Balkan-wars, and consequently it would be rational for Norway to do 
the same. When NATO requested that national CIMIC units be established, Norway acted 
upon the request. One CIMIC-officer suggested that one reason for deciding to contribute 
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with a CIMIC unit was to secure “…integration into NATO…”69 The clear intent that 
NATO CIMIC is Norwegian CIMIC also underscores this. A MoD official stressed that 
Norway wish to make NATO a multinational instrument.70 To secure NATO relevance 
would arguably be achieved by making any force contribution to a NATO operation. If it 
is possible to point to cases where Norway has turned down a NATO request for a force 
contribution to an operation, this would imply that other forces also are at play other than 
this strictly superior strategic one.  
 
The second Norwegian security-policy interest would be to position Norway with a 
relevant niche-capacity. The development of niche-capacities should to some extent be 
based on capacities and competencies which the nations already for different reasons 
master well. For Norway it would be natural to focus on capacities where the armed 
forces have a high competence, and the maintenance of national tasks would require the 
same capacities (Styrke og relevans 2004, article 172). Civil-military cooperation is not 
mentioned in Styrke og relevans as a niche-capacity. Yet it is by many perceived as such, 
and Prime Minister Bondevik stated on an occasion that “Norway is good on civil-
military cooperation” (cited in Eide 2003). A CIMIC-officer suggested the same, stating 
that Norway decided to contribute with CIMIC to “… maintain a Norwegian profile 
internationally, which suggests that we are relatively good on CIMIC, and that other 
nations perceive us as specialists.”71 
 
When asking the interviewees why we decided to contribute with CIMIC most of them 
had a more narrow approach to the answer than a political-strategic angle of incidence. 
This might have been due to the framing of the question. Still, I do not believe that the 
lack of informants pointing to these interests discard them. Stated policy suggests that 
they are highly relevant to the decision to contribute with CIMIC. Arguably NATO 
relevance would be better secured with a force contribution on the sharp end of the 
                                                 
69 Interview 1 June, 2005 
70 Interview 20 May, 2005 
71 Interview 1 June, 2005 
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military spectre, such as the F-16 Air Force unit contribution to Afghanistan which was 
also a very visible contribution. Perhaps this could be compensated for by the suggested 
niche-capacity quality of CIMIC.    
 
5.1.2 The military-strategic level 
5.1.2.1 CIMIC Group North, cost-effectiveness and experience 
 
I identified five military-strategic objectives which might have an impact on the decision 
to contribute with CIMIC in the methodological chapter. In this section I will elaborate on 
three of them. First it must be noted that the political-strategic and military-strategic 
levels are intertwined and the separation may seem a bit artificial. I choose to uphold the 
distinction in order to separate the superior political variables from the ones more military 
in nature. One CIMIC-officer claimed the following:   
 
“We contribute with CIMIC now because we are in the establishing-phase of CIMIC Group 
North, and it was a wish, a request to these different countries to contribute with CIMIC. We had 
the possibility to make that contribution, and it was a relevant force contribution at that time. We 
were supposed to participate, but did not have the capacity to have a greater engagement, as we 
had an entire battalion in Kosovo, but it was a little but visible contribution.” 72   
 
Another CIMIC-officer underlined that Norway wish to be a supplier of premises to 
doctrinal developments, both in CIMIC Group North and in the general development of 
doctrines for peacekeeping operations in the UN. Involvement in doctrinal work fosters 
participation, and this underlies the CIMIC effort according to the officer.73 The MoD 
official supports this notion, stating that “The AJP-9 has gained Norwegian approval. We 
                                                 
72 Interview 6 April, 2005 
73 Interview 1 June, 2005 
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were party to the making and are content with the result.”74 The CIMIC-officer continued 
to state that:  
 
“Norway contributes with CIMIC because it is cost-effective. We can send out a force-
contribution which displays the Norwegian flag, and in this manner satisfy the MFA. At the same 
time it does not put a heavy load on the officer corps, since CIMIC personnel are often recruited 
from civilian ranks. This does not cost the MoD too much, and hence we attain a minimum 
common multiple when it comes to the needs of the MFA and MoD.”    
 
The valuable experience of participating with CIMIC in Afghanistan was not emphasised 
by any of the interviewees. Despite this I will argue that any desire to develop CIMIC as a 
concept and Norwegian CIMIC policy would presuppose CIMIC experience. Accordingly 
experience will be relevant for the following discussions.  
 
As showed, the participation in CGN and the cost-effectiveness of CIMIC were 
emphasised by CIMIC-officers as vital to the decision to contribute with CIMIC. Some 
points made by the SSO complicate this picture. Norwegian participation in HQ CGN was 
suggested terminated. The motive for suggesting termination had to do with economic 
considerations, as it costs around five million NOK per year to participate in HQ CGN. 
Yet the reasons for continued participation were several according to the officer. CIMIC 
as such is very cost-effective both to obtain and run, and is positively received by the 
public opinion. The CIMIC elements were trained in HQ CGN before deployment to 
Afghanistan, and the North Sea Strategy Countries75 are participating, except for the U.K. 
Further on it would be politically unfortunate to terminate the Norwegian participation in 
an organization working within a field which is often emphasised by the Prime Minister 
                                                 
74 Interview 20 May, 2005 
75 The North Sea Strategy is a Norwegian initiative, giving Norway access to military capacities through 
multinational cooperation. The strategy is directed towards multinational defence-political cooperation with the 
U.K., Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, which are suitable strategic partners for Norway. Read more in 
Whitepaper 42 (2003-2004, article 3.6.7) 
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as being of great concern to Norway. In fact the Chief of Defence Norway (CHODN)76 
decided that Norway should participate in the establishment of CGN due to the fact that 
CIMIC is something positive, easily visible and relatively cheap.77 
 
Participation in CGN and the cost-effectiveness of CIMIC seem to be highly relevant to 
the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit.  
 
5.1.2.2 CIMIC as a concept 
 
The MoD official stated that “It was desirable for Norway to contribute with a CIMIC 
unit to Afghanistan in order to test CIMIC as a concept”, and continued to stress that 
“previously, such as in the Balkans, CIMIC has been a more integrated part of a greater 
Norwegian force-contribution.”78 Lack of extensive experience combined with conceptual 
confusion called for testing CIMIC as a concept. The PSO in Afghanistan provided an 
opportunity to translate the idea of specific CIMIC elements into practice. “Does 
everybody understand what CIMIC really is?” asked one of the CIMIC-officers 
rhetorically.79 The answer would seem to be “no”. Another CIMIC-officer stated that 
“many perceive CIMIC as a military NGO, both civilians and actually also military 
personnel. Still there are great misconceptions as to what CIMIC really is.”80 In the NUPI 
KFOR V database one officer claims that “Everything is CIMIC. This entire operation is 
more or less CIMIC.”81 This all-embracing understanding of CIMIC conflicts with the 
“conservative” CIMIC-approach preferred by states such as the U.S. and Germany 
presented in the introduction of this thesis, whilst it seems to fit the British approach in 
Kosovo. One of the Norwegian CIMIC-officers understands CIMIC as follows:  
 
                                                 
76 Forsvarssjefen (FSJ), Sigurd Frisvold 1999-2005 
77 Interview 23 September, 2005 
78 Interview 20 May, 2005 
79 Interview 13 May, 2005 
80 Interview 6 April, 2005 
81 NUPI database on KFOR V 
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“There are different understandings of what CIMIC is really about. My understanding, based on 
the NATO doctrine taught us prior to deployment, is that CIMIC activities should focus on 
obtaining information about the humanitarian situation in the area of operation. The object is to 
ensure that the Commander has knowledge of the humanitarian situation as part of the 
information used to assess the actions needed to reach the objective of the mission. If the 
Commander is of the opinion that use of military resources should be utilized in relation to 
humanitarian aid/projects, e.g. because the security situation does not allow IOs/NGOs to take 
care of such measures, this is also CIMIC.”82  
 
This perception of CIMIC also seems to clash with the “everything is CIMIC” 
understanding. Seemingly, CIMIC was deployed to Afghanistan without a full 
understanding of what was meant by it. Apparently relevant parties were conscious to this 
lack of understanding, and consequently the effort to “test the concept” by means of 
deploying a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan would be a rational step.   
 
5.1.2.3 A Norwegian CIMIC-policy 
 
Greve and Hertzeberg (2001:11) remark on a growing interest for CIMIC in Norway due 
to the participation in CGN and the establishment of the CIMIC-standby force. In a memo 
to the NUPI database on KFOR V, some lessons and points of concern for the Norwegian 
military regarding CIMIC are mentioned. The memo states that hardly any of the 
Norwegian officers working with CIMIC did have any experience in the area prior to 
deployment, and that this must be considered natural as CIMIC was a new area to the 
Norwegian military. Further on the lack of guidelines was thought to seriously disrupt the 
efficiency of CIMIC, and there was an expressed need to increase the understanding of 
the concept.   
 
                                                 
82 Interview  9 May, 2005 
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There are still no Norwegian CIMIC handbooks, but according to one CIMIC-officer 
“…it has been our goal to develop guidelines, but due to several factors such as loss of 
personnel to other jobs and the fact that we have been much out, it has not happened yet. 
But when Norwegian CIMIC guidelines are made they will be based on NATO 
CIMIC.”83 There is a growing awareness of the importance of CIMIC also in training. 
One CIMIC-officer emphasised that the NATO exercise Battle Griffin in the winter of 
2004 was the first exercise in Norway with the participation of specific CIMIC teams.84  
 
According to a CIMIC-officer institutional learning is secured by means of writing reports 
and the readiness force. Previously the Norwegian Defence International Centre 
(NODEFIC)85 had a lessons learned database, but it has been moved to the section in 
National Joint Headquarters (FOHK)86 responsible for training and lessons learned. At 
FOHK they have developed a database called Ferdaball.87 NODEFIC was closed down in 
July 2005, and the remaining tasks transferred to the Norwegian Defence College 
(NODC).88 
 
Sources suggest that the Norwegian CIMIC policy was in a fumble-phase at the end of the 
1990s. Consequent developments gave the Norwegian CIMIC policy a direction, but still 
there is a way to go, particularly considering the lack of written material and the need for 
new CIMIC-structures to consolidate. The embassy diplomat called for further inquires 
into the concept, stating that: 
 
“The embassy was not in the picture until a few days before deployment. I have expressed some 
wondering. Why CIMIC? The embassy was not asked for advice. Everything happened very fast. 
                                                 
83 Interview 6 April, 2005 
84 Interview 6 April, 2005. Battle Griffin was arranged in Nord-Trøndelag February 21 to March 11. 14 000 soldiers 
from 15 countries participated. The purpose of the field exercise was to train Norwegian and allied units and the 
NATO Response Force (NRF) in conflict management during winter-conditions. Source: 
http://www.mil.no/fol/ldks/start/_velser_LDKS_inter/_Battle_Griffin_5005/ 
85 Forsvarets Kompetansesenter for Internasjonal Virksomhet (FOKIV) 
86 Fellesoperativt Hovedkvarter (FOHK) 
87 Interview 6 April, 2005 
88 Forsvarets Skolesenter (FSS) 
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It seems to me that the less you involved the embassy, the easier things could get going. My hope 
is that the armed forces use more time to discuss different aspects with this concept, and that the 
MoD becomes more sensitive to contributions to the discussion.”89 
 
One MFA official also hints to the need for a more thorough decision-making process 
before deploying CIMIC: “The decision to contribute with CIMIC to Afghanistan was 
neither a proposal nor a decision made at the MFA. The armed forces and the MoD asked 
for funding of the CIMIC-projects after the decision had been made to contribute with a 
CIMIC-unit.”90  
 
Evidently the Norwegian CIMIC policy is developing. The decision to contribute with 
CIMIC will stimulate this process. Among the CIMIC-officers there seem to be a greater 
focus on the fact that Norwegian CIMIC is NATO CIMIC, than the perception of a 
Norwegian CIMIC-policy as such. It seems that the development of a Norwegian CIMIC-
policy was a natural effect of the decision to contribute with CIMIC, but I have not 
established that it was a stated objective.  
 
5.2 The impact of culturalism 
 
To investigate the impact of culturalism as developed by Elizabeth Kier I must first 
elaborate on the Norwegian political culture and the Norwegian military organizational 
culture. I will adapt the procedure of Kier presented in the methodological chapter, 
keeping in mind that these concepts are wide in their scope, their definitions are contested 
and manners of measurement are manifold. My effort will be to elaborate on specifics of 
the cultures which are relevant to my thesis, not attempting to present the whole picture. 
The hypothesis claims that: H 2: To contribute with a civil-military cooperation unit to 
                                                 
89 Interview 16 June, 2005 
90 Interview 3 June, 2005 
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Afghanistan was a Norwegian interest defined by Norwegian political and military 
organizational culture.   
 
5.2.1 CIMIC as a national interests defined by political and military 
organizational culture 
 
The development of certain military capacities need not necessarily be rational. Kier has 
shown how the choice of an offensive or defensive doctrine in France and Great Britain 
between the World Wars was not a result of rational imperatives or international 
constraints, but rather a consequence of the interaction between the domestic political 
culture and the military organizational culture. In this section I will discuss how indicators 
from the Norwegian political and military organizational cultures might have had an 
impact on the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan.  
 
Ulriksen (2002:246) claims that the Norwegian perception of war and peace is as follows: 
there is only war if there is war in Norway. And even if Norway commits forces to war 
abroad, there is still peace. The perception of war and peace is tied to the Norwegian 
territory, as a legacy of the defence tradition of 1905. Ulriksen (2002:249) continues to 
state that “In Norway it is quite all right to say that the armed forces are not suited for 
combat missions and that the soldiers can not fight. This does not even lead somebody to 
start teach them this, it is rather how it is suppose to be.” A great inquiry of the armed 
forces in 2003 showed that 79 % of the population approved of Norwegian participation 
in international military missions. Evidently the public accepted relatively great changes 
to the function and role of the army, with a stronger international focus and emphasis on 
peacekeeping missions. Yet, the public was positive to peacekeeping missions and far 
more reluctant to using Norwegian forces in combat internationally (Strømsod et al. 
2004).  
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It is politically costly to go to war when such perceptions prevail. This might explain why 
Prime Minister Bondevik needed two years to admit that Norway as a nation actually was 
at war in Kosovo. During a question-session in FOHK at Jåtta Prime Minister Bondevik 
had to admit that Norwegian F-16 pilots had been at war in Kosovo in 1999. He was 
asked whether he understood that the pilots reacted on his definition of the F-16 mission 
in Kosovo as “not-war”.  The Prime Minister replied:  
 
“…as a politician at that time I should have cut through all the juridical and international law 
considerations, and parallels with other wars in other parts of the world, and said yes, this is a 
war. We are sending Norwegian pilots into a war. So this I have learned” (Eide 2003). 
 
Participating in international military operations did not promote an officer or soldier’s 
military career historically speaking. Despite the fact that Norway was known to be a 
great contributor to UN peacekeeping missions during the Cold War, this participation 
was considered a bi-activity to military personnel. Findlay (1996:7) suggests that “old 
peacekeepers” like Norway regarded participation in peacekeeping as “the quintessence 
of good international citizenship.” But it was not regarded as the quintessence of military 
professionalism at home. During the 1990s this line of thinking was challenged. A 
generation of officers with experience from complex, multinational military missions 
replaced the “Cold War Warrior” generation. Today the picture has changed, and a 
professional military career is almost inconceivable if the soldier or officer lack 
experience from international operations. Yet, the degree of positive valuation may vary. 
On the question of whether CIMIC is “accepted” by the more traditional military 
branches, one officer replies “No, I will not say that. CIMIC is perceived as an “out-
group”, an alternative, opportunistic career path, and not real military work, but rather a 
politically correct matter which smells a bit. I disagree with such an attitude. Military 
operations are helpless without CIMIC.”91 
 
                                                 
91 Interview 1 June, 2005 
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One final point on the previously required connection between Norwegian territory and 
military events of significance has to do with the well-established Norwegian conception 
of a “people’s defence” and the total-defence concept. Despite the fact that CIMIC as a 
force contribution and civil-military cooperation in a total-defence context must not be 
confused as mentioned before, I will still suggest that the strong legacy of a total-defence 
concept where all components of society are intended to interact in order to meet a crisis 
makes the CIMIC concept and experience more relevant and topical.  
 
Ulriksen (2002:19) argues that the Norwegian armed forces for almost two hundred years, 
and specially the last hundred, have been designed first and foremost to cover other needs 
than the purely military ones. Norwegian self-image is constituted of e.g. “peace nation” 
and “humanitarian great power” perceptions. “Civil-military cooperation sounds great” 
said one of my interviewees.92 Why is that, one might wonder. Arguably it does not sound 
that good in all ears. 
 
The need for humanitarian labels is a product of this tradition, and hence the focus on 
“humanitarian” force contributions, military personnel doing “humanitarian” work and so 
on. The purely military component is down-scaled. The knowledge of political 
communication is that war sells badly to the Norwegian audience. Even the armed forces 
emphasise the “humanitarian” aspects of their operations. The headlines on articles 
published in military magazines and on Forsvarsnett regarding the CIMIC mission hints 
to this, such as “The 52 good helpers” (Kvam 2002), “The start of humanitarian help in 
uniform” (Hjelseth 2003), “Friendly activities by Kabul” (Grut 2003), “A helping hand” 
(Løvhaug 2004) and “Ending the relief efforts” (Wangberg 2004)93. The Prime Minister 
was also asked if the labels “humanitarian officer” and “humanitarian focus” were 
necessary to obtain popular and political support to the use of the Norwegian armed 
forces in international operations. He answered: 
                                                 
92 Interview 22 September, 2005 
93 My translations of Norwegian web-articles 
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 “I do not think it to be necessary to gain support, but I think it is desirable in order to increase 
the support… I believe that when some of the operations also have a humanitarian outlook, it is 
an advantage. We know that armed conflicts lead to destruction of civilian structures. I think it is 
important that Norway can contribute, both through voluntary organizations doing this kind of 
work, but also through the armed forces” (Eide 2003).  
 
The discussion so forth touches on relevant aspects of the military organizational culture 
as well. It might be suggested that the motivations for military personnel to participate in 
international military missions have changed. Perhaps idealism and adventure were more 
prominent motivational aspects during the Cold War. Equally they may be more 
prominent when participating in a force contribution perceived as a bit un-military. 
Norwegian CIMIC prescribes a minimum use of force, and a great focus on consent. To 
some officers CIMIC aspires to a great degree of humanitarian efforts, whilst others 
emphasise that any efforts must be in support of the military mission. The humanitarian 
worker makes the following suggestion when it comes to the understandings of 
Norwegian military personnel in PSOs:  
 
“Within the Norwegian armed forces a good institutional practice and a clear understanding has 
been developed that we are not going out to fight a war, we are going out to secure peace, and to 
make sure that the places we go to does not become less peaceful. We try to solve conflicts and to 
de-escalate them.”94 
 
One CIMIC officer believed that the political authorities back home perceived the 
contribution as humanitarian aid by means of military personnel.95 Evidently CIMIC is a 
force-contribution which is easily sold to the Norwegian public. It is certainly politically 
costly to go to war, but it would be less costly when attaching a “humanitarian” label to 
the military mission. CIMIC is a combat support function, and hence not dimensioned for 
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combat missions. CIMIC is consistent with the kind of force contributions the Norwegian 
public positively embrace. The Norwegian political and military organizational culture 
seems to define CIMIC as an interest. 
 
Yet what about the sharper end of the spectrum of military tools? According to Moldjord 
et al. (2003), Norwegian international military activities may increasingly be 
characterized as “sharp” operations. They mention that a simulated town is being built at 
Rena, where Norwegian soldiers are to be trained in fighting in built-up areas. They also 
mention the use of Norwegian Special Forces in direct combat-missions against the 
Taliban in Afghanistan, and how this officially is one of very few operations since the 
Second World War where Norwegian soldiers have participated in combat-operations. 
October 2001 Norway deployed six F-16 combat planes to Afghanistan. This was also the 
first time since the Second World War that Norwegian combat planes participated in 
bombardment missions abroad.96 When the mission was completed at the end of March 
2003, the Norwegian planes had been requested to assist coalition forces under fire and 
consequently dropped bombs against hostile positions three times.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
96 Norway also deployed F-16 combat planes to Kosovo in 1999 as earlier mentioned, but at that time the Norwegian 
planes did not have the demanded air-to-surface capacity, in addition to some operative inadequacies in the darkness, 
and consequently could not be used in “sharp” attacks targeting positions on the ground.    
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6. During deployment: The Norwegian approach to civil-
military cooperation in Afghanistan 
 
6.1 The impact of military rationalism and national security-policy 
interests  
 
 
To investigate the Norwegian approach to CIMIC within a rationalist framework I will 
analyze how national security-policy interests influenced the approach. Further on I will 
analyze to what degree the Norwegian CIMIC unit acted in accordance with the NATO 
CIMIC doctrine on the tactical level. The hypothesis claims that: H 3: The Norwegian 
approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan was a rational military approach 
maximizing Norwegian security-policy interests. 
 
6.1.1 The political-strategic level 
 
On the political-strategic level during deployment the national security interests discussed 
in section 5.1 was sought promoted by means of visibility. According to Heier (2005:4) 
Norway has limited political and military resources. Norway is not a member of the EU, 
and member of a NATO where decisions are increasingly settled in advance, between the 
great powers and between the EU-members. The NATO-US channel is put under pressure 
from a gradually more dynamic EU-U.S. channel. Consequently, according to Heier, the 
Norwegian fear of marginalization is real. Influence over our own security-policy 
interests demands participation in the international processes where decisions are being 
made. Military force contributions is a means to achieve this objective. To be able to 
make substantial contributions are important. I cannot prove that the decision to 
contribute with CIMIC gave Norway access to forums where decisions are made. But I 
will discuss how the force contribution was profiled in terms of visibility.  
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There seem to have been a common understanding in the Norwegian CIMIC elements of 
certain expectations linked to their deployment from the political authorities back home in 
Norway. According to one officer “The MFA most probably expected it, and the political 
authorities certainly expected that as we went down with CIMIC elements, we would do 
projects to put the Norwegian flag on display.”97  
 
The MFA, via the embassy, acted as the relevant authority for the Norwegian CIMIC 
units. “The MoD did not wish to steer CIMIC”, claimed one officer, and continued to 
state that “political concession was granted to the MFA”. Seemingly, as the decision to 
contribute with CIMIC had been secured, the MoD had reached its primary objective, 
which according to the officer was “integration into NATO, and to secure a continuing 
role for Norway in ISAF.”98 The source of the aspiration to project the Norwegian flag 
seems to be a bit disputed. My interviewees in the MFA were not pleased with the efforts 
to display the Norwegian flag on CIMIC projects. Their reasons were several. According 
to them it was not necessarily desirable that everybody should know where the money 
came from, it sufficed that the Norwegian contribution was noted in the statistics. Further 
on the local attachment to the projects should be in focus, and the Afghan flag should be 
on the projects. One CIMIC-officer suggested that ideally the ISAF flag should be on the 
projects, and consequently that whoever carried out the projects were not of the essence.99 
 
Tvedt (2003:70) points to how the differences in values and discourse of the Norwegian 
relief system on the one hand and the traditional foreign policy branch on the other may 
cause problems. He exemplifies his claim by discussing a suggestion made in the middle 
of the 1980s to have some small Norwegian flags on tents financed by Norway through 
the budgets of relief-organizations. The reply at that time was rejection; the organizations 
were in Ethiopia to help, not to promote Norway. In the middle of the 1990s the same 
tents were back in Ethiopia, and the suggestion was made again that small flags should be 
                                                 
97 Interview 9 May, 2005 
98 Interview 1 June, 2005 
99 Interview 9 May, 2005 
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on the tents. This time the Norwegian MFA had other ideas; Norway should be flagged 
and given a high profile, and big Norwegian flags were put on the tents. The “bridge-
building suggestion” of small flags lost both times. The differences between the relief 
branch and the foreign policy branch are arguably present within the MFA today, and 
might explain why the CIMIC officers understood it to be a MFA expectation that 
Norwegian flags be put on display, whilst the MFA officials with whom I have spoken, 
did not wish to project the Norwegian flag on CIMIC projects.100 Yet the MFA did 
contribute to the promotion of the projects through the presence of the charge d’ affairs to 
“lend some lustre” by e.g. inaugurating schools. The embassy diplomat stated that:  
 
“We wanted to flag lower. The MoD wanted to forward this. Actually you should believe that the 
armed forces would prefer a lower profile than the MFA, but in this case it was the other way 
around. In my opinion it was overexposed. Had the Minister of International Development seen 
the Norwegian flag on the post outside the school when she came on a visit, she would not have 
been pleased.”101 
 
Apparently, one part of the national agenda of Norway was accomplished as we 
contributed with CIMIC as such. Another part was to be accomplished by means of using 
the Norwegian flag. One officer claimed that “I am possibly naïve, but I will claim that 
Norway did not have a national agenda. But, of course, by using the Norwegian flag, then 
we did, we could have chosen to do ISAF-projects and down scale the national, but then 
again no one did that.”102 The perception of Norway as a country lacking a national 
agenda is in line with several statements in the NUPI database on KFOR as well, such as 
the statement of this officer “We are perceived as a country with a little or no national 
agenda, and we are edible to the great powers.”103 The humanitarian informant also 
supports this, stating that “Norway is not a great-political player, and is consequently able 
                                                 
100 The suggested dividing line between the relief branch and the foreign policy branch in the MFA may seem a bit 
black and white. Certainly the division is more complex, and the organizations may have developed more crossing 
dividing lines. The picture is more complicated than described, but arguably still relevant. 
101 Interview 16 June, 2005 
102 Interview 6 April, 2005 
103 NUPI database on KFOR V  
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to operate very freely, and that is an advantage. I believe that is why Norwegian CIMIC 
has been well-liked by the national populations the places where I have met them.”104 
 
Several interviewees in the NUPI database on KFOR underline the important and positive 
effects of showing national flags. One officer claims that “It has a great effect to show 
flags. It demonstrates that KFOR is multinational and that the nation supports the 
mission,”105 and another that “Everybody agree that showing different flags is a good 
thing. It shows unity of effort.”106  
 
Seemingly it is not plausible to detach the CIMIC-contributions from a national agenda. 
But the national agendas of different nations vary a great deal, influenced by other 
commitments in the operational theatre, commercial interests, national interests and so on. 
In this respect financing and agendas will be closely linked. On the question of whether 
national agendas influenced CIMIC, one officer answered “Definitely, the EU financed 
Sweden and Finland, the EU does not grant money without a note, and neither does 
Norway.”107 According to this officer the fact that the MFA had to approve every project 
pointed to strong national control. One nation which clearly used their CIMIC capacity to 
support a national agenda seems to have been the Germans. One CIMIC-officer said “The 
Germans were in charge of the police, they were mandated to rebuild the police in 
Afghanistan. This does not necessarily go hand in hand with the military mission.”108 The 
Germans have mixed CIMIC work with a national agenda also previously, in Kosovo: “A 
German unit… has built 12000 – 13000 houses. In that lie national interests: they want to 
get people out of Germany.”109 
 
                                                 
104 Interview 11 March, 2005 
105 NUPI database on KFOR V  
106 NUPI database on KFOR V  
107 Interview 1 June, 2005 
108 Interview 6 April, 2005 
109 NUPI database on KFOR V – the “people” the Germans wanted to expel was Kosovar Albanians refugees 
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As mentioned before the Norwegian CIMIC contribution was financed from the 
humanitarian budget in the MFA. According to Rollins (2001:127):  
 
“…the vast majority of funding for CIMIC activities comes from national sources channelled 
through national contingents. This is a fact of life and there need be nothing wrong with it per se 
– provided that such action does not compromise either the NATO theatre-level plan or – by 
extension – activities carried out by civilian organizations.” 
 
One MFA official stated that the financing of projects made by military units to gain force 
protection should be financed by the MoD, and not over the humanitarian budget. The 
official continued to state that this viewpoint was common quite far up in the MFA 
hierarchy.110 The notion of MoD financing is supported by a CIMIC officer stating that 
“MoD financing would have made things easier.”111 
 
One CIMIC officer stated that “In my opinion NATO funds should have been at the 
disposal of the force commander.”112 Another officer commented that it was a little 
original to have national funds, by some perceived as “oilmoney” in the Norwegian case. 
Sweden and Finland arguably found themselves on unequal terms, having to apply to 
Brussels. This officer found that the funding of the Norwegian CIMIC lead to an 
increased dynamic, by virtue of an increased possibility for activity, and was an 
advantage relationally as the Afghans understood the Norwegian capability of getting 
things done fast. Perceivably this was good from the perspective of the Norwegians, but 
might be a problem from the perspective of the entire operation, as it lead to “... a 
distortion within the area of operations.”113 According to one CIMIC-officer: 
 
                                                 
110 Interview 3 June, 2005  
111 Interview 23 August, 2005. The price for the Norwegian officers in Iraq during the first half of 2003 was 99.6 
million NOK, of which 57 million NOK was from the humanitarian budget in the MFA. According to Stene (2005: 
10) intense debates followed in the wake of this funding. In 2004 all expenses were covered by the defence-budget.  
112 Interview 6 April, 2005 
113 Interview 1 June, 2005 
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“Ideally the CCC should be able to identify the needs, and insert resources based on these 
assessments. But this is not how it worked in practice. Every nation provides their contingent 
with a budget. We were financed by the MFA, and had spacious frames for action compared to 
others. From an isolated point of view this is unfortunate because certain areas may be favoured 
with more support, even though these areas originally are better off than others”114 
 
One officer warns against the “Santa-Clause syndrome,” where the content feeling of 
having done something good to somebody blinds you to the fact that people are worse off 
just around the corner.115 According to another CIMIC officer: 
 
 “You go in, and you create expectations, and you do something within one district which others 
can not do in another, and this may create conflicts, but I am uncertain whether these conflicts 
have greater repercussions on solving the military mission than the positive effects actually 
created.”116 
 
This problem is not unique to Afghanistan. One of the officers in the NUPI database on 
KFOR stated that: 
 
“People in Kosovo get one or the other KFOR nation to their area in order to create a “Safe and 
Secure Environment”. Some get Norwegians, others Spaniards. Certainly the tasks are not dealt 
with in the same manner in the different areas… despite the differences it is important to try to 
standardize. The force as a whole should act as unified as possible, sending one signal.”117 
 
Norwegian CIMIC was a visible contribution. The execution of a great number of projects 
funded by the MFA increased the visibility. Despite the divergent perspectives on the 
degree of “flagging” no non-flag or bridge-building suggestions prevailed. National 
                                                 
114 Interview 9 May, 2005 
115 Interview 23 August, 2005 
116 Interview 6 April, 2005 
117 NUPI database on KFOR V 
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financing combined with the possibility to focus on the Norwegian areas of responsibility, 
created synergy-effects.  
 
6.1.2 The tactical level 
6.1.2.1 Civil-military liaison 
 
Civil-military liaison aims at the creation of necessary coordination with civilian bodies. 
The establishment, promotion and maintenance of coordination are perceived as a pre-
condition for the other two core CIMIC functions. Liaison is also intended to obtain the 
support of the population, IOs and NGOs (AJP-9, article 104-a). The fact that there are 
not waterproof bulkheads between the three CIMIC core functions was stressed by a 
CIMIC-officer. He illustrated this point as follows:  
 
“Broadly speaking we spend 50 percent of our time on support to the civil society, 30 percent on 
liaison, 20 percent on support to the force, and much of this was liaison, at the same time support 
to the civilian society and liaison may be perceived as 80 percent.”118  
 
Another CIMIC-officer supports this point. According to him what the Norwegian CIMIC 
units in Afghanistan did the most, was support to the civil society. But as the CIMIC units 
travelled around and collected data on the state of affairs in their districts, they developed 
an understanding of what happened and how the situation was in that particular area, and 
hence this activity would simultaneously be support to the force.119 Accordingly the three 
core functions are closely intertwined, and certain activities may carry multiple labels. 
Support to the civil environment may also be liaison and support to the force at the same 
time. It is noteworthy that what is intended to be the most important core function, liaison, 
was the least emphasised and elaborated by the CIMIC-officers. This might be due to the 
fact that liaison, as stated above, is very much integrated into the other core functions. It 
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119 Interview 6 April, 2005 
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might also be the case that the coordination mechanisms are established first and foremost 
in the early stages of the deployment, and that the consequent units are adopting 
established procedures and focusing more on other tasks.    
 
According to one CIMIC-officer, it was of the essence to find out which NGOs were 
operating in the area, and then start relation-building. At the same time it was important to 
pinpoint local power players, IOs and NGOs and to establish formal contacts. By means 
of contact the actors would avoid duplication of work and secure the spreading of 
resources in the shared area of responsibility.120 The relationship between the CIMIC-
elements and the other actors are seemingly not perceived as black or white, but with 
many shades of grey, ranging from informal to formal with a constant focus on relation-
building. As will be seen later this picture is supported by the humanitarian informant.  
 
6.1.3.2 Support to the civil environment 
 
Support to the civil environment refers to the interaction with civilian bodies, and covers 
a wide spectrum of activities. AJP-9 article 104-b lists a wide range of conceivable 
military support, such as information, material, equipment, training, communications and 
transport facilities.   
 
We have already seen how one of the CIMIC-officers pointed to support to the civil 
environment as the most time-consuming core function. The CIMIC teams had daily 
contact with representatives of the local authorities in different villages, visiting district 
governors and the district administrations. They had meetings with the maliks in the 
villages, in addition to the weekly malik-meetings with the governor. The CIMIC teams 
talked with people in the streets, and handed out the ISAF-newspaper.  
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In the two districts the Norwegian CIMIC teams operated there was a low presence of 
humanitarian organizations. The reason why is unknown, though part of the explanation 
may be that the area was not prioritized by the humanitarian community. The 
humanitarian worker hints to this by stating:  
 
“The CIMIC function was localized in Kabul. There are certain needs in the Kabul-area, but the 
real needs are out on the countryside, and not in Kabul. Hence, from a development-perspective 
and a humanitarian perspective we do not think that money should be granted to those operating 
within Kabul, but rather to those operating outside the capital.”121 
 
Some hotly debated issues with the military CIMIC function has to do with the 
relationship between the military and the humanitarian actors. In this section some of 
these issues will be elaborated as they are vital to the whole context of civil-military 
cooperation.  
 
Two NGOs did operate in the two Norwegian districts, and those were the Swedish 
Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) and ACTED.122 Seemingly the Norwegian CIMIC-
officers did not encounter any particular problems or reluctance when cooperating with 
these humanitarian organizations on the ground. According to one officer “We had an ok 
relationship with them. On the tactical ground level, I did not experience any particular 
difficulties when cooperating with humanitarian organizations.”123 The Swedish 
Committee for Afghanistan had been in the country for a long time, and according to an 
officer efforts were made to draw on SCA background expertise for project 
implementation followed by common profiling when the project was finalized. The 
officer did not know the success of these efforts due to rotation, but remarks on the 
willingness of the SCA to be part of such an arrangement.124 
                                                 
121 Interview 11 March, 2005 
122 Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (Agence d’aide à la cooperation technique et au 
development) 
123 Interview 6 April, 2005 
124 Interview 9 May, 2005 
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The humanitarian informant points to one source of frustration, due to the frequent 
rotation of CIMIC elements. Every time a new CIMIC element arrives people come in 
search for information, and this could be tiresome to the busy humanitarians. The 
humanitarian worker issues a need for institutional memory in the rotational-process, and 
also a need for better horizontal self-coordination between different national CIMIC units. 
Coordination of the humanitarian efforts in PSOs is also inadequate. Organizations have 
been established in an effort to mend this, such as the IASC mentioned before. The IASC 
reference paper on the civil-military relationship states that “Coordination amongst 
humanitarian actors, preferably leading to a common approach to civil-military relations 
in a given complex emergency, is… desirable” (2004:7). 
 
On the higher levels there seem to have been more reluctance and problems. The NGOs 
were invited to weekly meetings at the CCC where ACTED did join, but otherwise there 
was little contact on that level.125 The humanitarian informant supports this: 
  
 “I did not wish to be seen with the military in a public setting, and we held a general distance 
from the military. We had some meetings on the Norwegian embassy, where humanitarian 
organizations, the military and the police had meetings, sharing information, who does what, 
what needs to be done and so on, and briefings on security, and that was very fine. But in general 
we kept a polite distance. This is also a question of security, if we are perceived as a part of the 
military mission our security is in danger. Hence I have only met with the military either in 
meetings facilitated by others or in informal settings.”126 
 
In this quote the humanitarian worker hints to the increased security concerns 
humanitarian workers are faced with as military actors extend their traditional roles and 
mandates. A fragile balance surfaces, where the cost to the security of civilians must be 
weighted against the actual profit made by the military actors in terms of winning the 
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“hearts and minds” of the local population.  Rana (2004:568) calls this the “narrowing 
down of the humanitarian environment” and continues to claim that “…the distinction 
between civilian agencies and military actors will increasingly cease to be relevant in the 
eyes of the population and authorities” (ibid:580). Johansen (2004) points to the fact that 
military personnel are legitimate military targets, and hence the civilian population are 
being dangerously exposed when military personnel are taking upon them civilian tasks 
such as building houses and distributing food. Whitepaper 39 (2003-2004, article 6.2.2) 
points to the importance of maintaining the humanitarian principles of neutrality and 
impartiality, and continues to state that too close coordination and collaboration between 
military and humanitarian actors might reduce the local populations perception of 
humanitarian neutrality. The increased security concerns of humanitarian workers are 
evident in this statement made by MSF: 
 
“The violence directed against humanitarian aid workers has come in a context in which the US 
backed coalition has consistently sought to use humanitarian aid to build support for its military 
and political ambitions. MSF denounces the coalition’s attempts to co-opt humanitarian aid and 
use it to win “hearts and minds”. By doing so, providing aid is no longer seen as an impartial and 
neutral act, endangering the lives of humanitarian volunteers and jeopardizing the aid to people in 
need. Only recently, on May 12th 2004, MSF publicly condemned the distribution of leaflets by 
the coalition forces in southern Afghanistan in which the population was informed that providing 
information about the Taliban and al-Qaeda was necessary if they wanted the delivery of aid to 
continue” (Statement by MSF, 28 July 2004 quoted in Rana 2004) 
 
This statement concerns humanitarian aid provided by the military in the American-led 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The fact that military actors are present in 
Afghanistan mandated both to secure peace and stability, and at the same time being a 
warring faction in an actual war presents an additional problem according to the 
humanitarian worker.127 In this respect the military appears to have several mandates, not 
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one clear mandate. On the other hand, as one officer stresses, NGOs turn up in a conflict-
area equipped with a myriad of mandates.128 The humanitarian worker also emphasises 
that the inherent difference in mandates is the reason why they do not wish to coordinate 
with the military component, and continues “…we do not mean that the military should 
have the same mandate as us. It is essential that the military deals with what is their basic 
mandate, and that is to secure the peace.”129 The informants from the MFA support this 
notion. The difference in mandates is inherent, and it might provide different answers to 
the same question 
 
As the dividing lines between the humanitarian and military “spaces” are becoming 
increasingly blurred, areas of contention and problems are surfacing leading to public 
debates, research and the development of guidelines in an attempt to sort out the 
relationship between humanitarians and the military. The ICRC adopted the “Guidelines 
for Civil-Military Relations” in 2001. According to Rana (2004:567, footnote 3) the term 
“Civil-Military Relations” was consciously chosen in order to differentiate between the 
ICRC’s term and the military terms of CIMIC, CMO and CA. Rana (2004:576, footnote 
20) describes an invidious encounter between the ICRC and the ISAF Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) deployed in the Afghan town of Kunduz. The PRT forces 
chose to support a hospital that had been part of the ongoing medical programmes of 
ICRC. The ICRC chose to withdraw in order to avoid duplication of efforts and reduce 
the risk of humanitarians being confused with military forces in the eyes of native 
civilians. With the next rotation of ISAF forces it was decided that the programme no 
longer fitted with ISAF objectives and finances, and consequently the ICRC had to 
resume its support to the hospital.  
 
Whitepaper 39 article 6.2.2 states that “When military personnel in exceptional cases 
execute tasks of a civilian nature it is important that these activities are distinctly 
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divergent from the activity of civilian organizations.” Rana (2004:574) points to the fact 
that the modus operandi of humanitarian actors and CIMIC are almost identical in 
implementation when it comes to needs assessments, definition of projects, securing of 
financing, finding implementing partners or contractors and evaluating the impacts of 
their projects. One CIMIC-officer labelled it “international tourism,”130 when a multiple 
of actors enter a theatre and map and map in the same manner. Sufficient coordination-
mechanisms would be desirable, but here the explained unwillingness of humanitarian 
actors plays in. Evidently a system of economic mapping would require the ability to act 
on the assessment pretty fast, and here the military has an advantage, according to the 
officer.   
 
6.1.3.3 Support to the force 
 
The core function of support to the force acknowledges that CIMIC plays a major role in 
achieving civilian support from within the operational theatre. AJP-9 article 104-c states 
that the force may be partially dependent on civilian information and resources, and that 
commanders will seek as much tacit support as possible.  
 
This core function is conspicuously similar to a basic military priority, namely force 
protection. In both interviews and literature “support to the force” and “force protection” 
have been employed to describe the same function. I believe there is a certain difference 
between the two concepts. Traditional, physical force protection may be understood as 
protection of the forces by means of fire arms and armoured protection, and keeping a 
distance to local actors on the ground. Americans have been criticized for putting too 
much priority on physical force protection, and hence jeopardizing their ability to obtain 
consent from local authorities and populations (Nissen 2002:11). Support to the force, on 
the other hand, seems to imply opposite measures. By being present on the ground, 
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having constant interaction with both authorities and ordinary locals, assessing needs and 
perhaps launching projects based on the needs-assessments, support to the force will be 
obtained as a measure of good-will. This reflects on the “winning hearts and minds” 
thinking. Mæland also discuss the notion of betting your security on relations with the 
local population. His conclusion is that “Relations have a potential for power. Relations 
are power” (Mæland 2004:212, his emphasis).  
 
Operating in the French area of responsibility, the Norwegian CIMIC teams were 
intended to support the French in the first instance and then ISAF. This was not easily 
accomplished, as elaborated on by a CIMIC officer who also touches on inherent 
problems with “force-protection” measures:  
 
“We worked a lot on our own. In other areas the CIMIC units were more integrated into the 
force. Ideally we should have been integrated into the French contingent, and worked more 
directly for them, not on the outside. Then we would be able to support the force in a better 
manner at the same time as they could provide security for us in cases where it might be called 
upon. Occasionally we wished for a stronger attachment, also believing that it would be more 
secure for us if we had back-up. Yet we did get support in special situations, and we could 
certainly not drive around with armoured vehicles in front and behind us for protection at all 
times, that would send out completely wrong signals.”131  
 
One CIMIC officer stated that his CIMIC team spent 50 % of their time on liaison and 50 
% on support to the civil environment. Accordingly they did not attain support to the 
force. The fact that the Norwegian CIMIC teams did not live with the French was an 
impediment according to the officer, as social relations is of the essence to be able to 
cooperate. He continued “We were meant to support the French and ISAF, but we 
supported ISAF in lack of relations with the French. On the other hand, did we primarily 
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support ISAF or were we busy spending MFA money?”132 The officer questions what also 
others in my interview-selection have questioned: the “support to the force-effect” by 
doing projects. Undoubtedly it is useful to the district villages to get new schools, but to 
the military mission this is not the issues. The issue is whether the CIMIC financing of 
new schools obtains support to the force and in this respect is vital to the security and 
operational efforts of ISAF. Several interviewees question this effect. And certainly it is 
not likely that local authorities and populations provide information in order to support 
the force, except for people extremely pleased of its presence. They are rather interested 
in potential projects to relieve their villages. This indicates the intertwined relationship 
between the core functions, where support to the force rather becomes a function of the 
successful accomplishment of the other two core functions. The superior aim to keep in 
mind though, is that CIMIC activities is, according to the doctrine, supposed to be “in 
support of the mission”, not in support of the civilian environment. Support to the civilian 
environment should be limited to the degree that it supports the military mission.      
 
The humanitarian worker has a slightly other angle of incidence, when asking rhetorically 
“Can they secure security in the operational area? Or are they using most of the time to 
secure their own security?”133 As we have seen the accomplishment of the support to the 
force function must be questioned. Yet the questions posed do not necessarily conflict in 
the manner perceived. The ISAF mandate commits ISAF to provide a safe and secure 
environment. CIMIC is a force commander’s tool to execute a series of functions in 
support of the mission, one of these functions being support to the force. The more secure 
international military forces are within their operational theatre, the more easily they may 
commit to the mandate.   
 
6.1.3.4 Observance of NATO CIMIC doctrine 
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The project-oriented approach to CIMIC in Afghanistan is not in accordance with NATO 
CIMIC doctrine. The low presence of NGOs in the Norwegian districts offers a possible 
explanation of the project-oriented CIMIC approach. Perhaps it was natural to the 
Norwegian CIMIC teams to take upon them projects in the absence of humanitarian 
organizations? One CIMIC-officer declined this:    
 
“Well, it is not natural. CIMIC is not project work, our job is to establish and maintain contact, 
liaison, to map the situation, and point out that certain needs might be present in certain areas. 
And then, ideally, other organizations are meant to go in and do the projects.”134  
 
Another officer stressed that to be able to gain information about the humanitarian 
situation may be very hard if the local population does not believe that they will receive 
something back in terms of projects.135 The low presence of humanitarian actors in the 
Norwegian districts may have distorted the ideal division of labour and moved the CIMIC 
activities further into the “project-window.” The main reason for the discrepancy between 
doctrine and practice seem to be the fact that CJ9 was lead by Finland, who are not a 
NATO-member and hence not obliged to follow AJP-9. The CIMIC-officer declining 
project-orientation as a natural consequence of the circumstances continued to state that: 
 
“The reason why we did what we did in Afghanistan, I will claim, is that is was a well-
established procedure upon our arrival. And my claim is also that such project-oriented CIMIC is 
very much a Finnish legacy, as CIMIC was run by them from the beginning, and their CIMIC 
policy is very project-oriented. In my opinion, this is not CIMIC.”136  
 
A path had been drawn in advance of the arrival of Norwegian CIMIC teams, influenced 
by the Finnish leadership. The Norwegian teams followed this path, together with the 
other elements under the J9 and CCC structure. According to one officer CIMIC was 
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“…not related to the military mission in Afghanistan. It was advantageous to the local 
population but lacking military gains.”137 
 
Another potential reason for the project-orientation of CIMIC in Afghanistan has to do 
with financing. According to one officer, by being granted 5 million NOK, the Norwegian 
CIMIC teams would perhaps feel committed to do activities not within the CIMIC 
doctrine.138 Another suggestion is that project-oriented CIMIC is partly an American 
legacy. The NATO CIMIC doctrine may be perceived as a European-edition doctrine, 
which is put under increasing pressure from the Americans. One MFA official states that 
the NATO doctrine in itself is conservative and easy for humanitarian actors to accept.  
 
Germany, England and Italy, which were disconnected from the ISAF structure, differed 
slightly in their approaches. As already noted, the Germans were bound by a national 
agenda. One CIMIC-officer noted about the British: 
 
“The British are quite close to NATO CIMIC, but they have developed their own doctrine, and 
perhaps they use CIMIC more consciously to support their national agenda. They were in fact 
closer to NATO CIMIC than the rest of us in Afghanistan, in that their CIMIC units were much 
more integrated into their force.”139  
 
His statement points to another source of discrepancy between doctrine and practice. 
NATO CIMIC doctrine does not prescribe CIMIC to be a “sideline” activity. There seem 
to be inherent dangers in the potential “sideline” character of CIMIC activities. One 
CIMIC-officer warns against the incremental development of CIMIC into a “half-military 
NGO,”140 by way of the temptation of domestic political authorities to provide 
“guidelines” on CIMIC activities not in conjuncture with NATO CIMIC doctrine. This 
                                                 
137 Interview 23 August, 2005 
138 Interview 13 May, 2005 
139 Interview 6 April, 2005 
140 Interview 13 May, 2005 
     
 102
reflects on the project-orientation once again. One officer observes optimistically in light 
of recent developments in Iraq and Afghanistan “Now we see that CIMIC increasingly is 
treated as part of the operation, during all phases, and not something which is being kept 
on the sideline.”141 Another officer compares CIMIC in Afghanistan with CIMIC in 
Kosovo, claiming that in Kosovo CIMIC was integrated into the operation, in a manner 
where “everybody did CIMIC work”, whereas in Afghanistan CIMIC was more on the 
sideline.142  
 
One CIMIC-officer highlighted the difficulties of adopting the doctrine entirely, due to 
different national economic presuppositions. In isolation the best thing would be if all 
means could be channelled to NATO and then out to the operational theatres, but this is 
hardly attainable suggested the officer, as it would be hard for political authorities to grant 
money if forces from other countries were to spend them.143   
 
One CIMIC officer stressed the possibility for interpretations within the given 
frameworks.144 Frantzen (2005:4) writes that military doctrines “…will seldom be specific 
and detailed but rather broad and general to allow for improvisation and adaptation in 
accordance with the special circumstances of each conflict.” This is certainly true, but 
seemingly Norwegian CIMIC in Afghanistan operated partly outside the AJP-9 
framework without this being due to special circumstances in the operational theatre. 
Nissen (2002:24-25) emphasizes the need for a focus beyond doctrine. According to him 
decisions made on the ground do not necessarily reflect doctrine, and further on he claims 
that doctrinal development with regards to PSO traditionally has lagged behind the 
development of organizational behaviour. His notions seem to be validated in this case, 
and perhaps the conceptual confusion surrounding CIMIC combined with further 
experiences and pressures will lead to doctrinal adaptation to the operational realities. The 
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interesting fact yet to notice is that the Norwegian CIMIC officers embrace the NATO 
CIMIC doctrine, some expressing that the discrepancies they experienced between 
doctrine and practice in fact made parts of their activities “not CIMIC.”145  
 
6.2 The impact of culturalism and social learning 
 
The culturalist hypothesis seeking to explain the Norwegian approach to CIMIC suggests 
that: H 4:  The Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan was a 
product of the Norwegian political and military organizational culture and the impact of 
social learning. 
 
6.2.1 The Norwegian approach to CIMIC in Afghanistan as a product of 
political culture and military organizational culture 
 
When it comes to the Norwegian approach to CIMIC in Afghanistan, the causal impact of 
political culture must be questioned. In this case Kier’s model might be too one-sided, 
putting too much emphasis on political culture for it to be relevant for small states. It is 
likely that social learning has an interfering impact on the Norwegian approach to CIMIC 
in Afghanistan. In this section I will discuss how the political and military culture may 
influence the Norwegian approach to CIMIC. This will be done partly in a comparative 
light, where the different “flavours” of national contingents will be highlighted.  
 
I focused on two indicators when elaborating on the Norwegian political culture, namely 
the territorial bond of the historical defence traditions and the Norwegian peace tradition. 
The historical defence-traditions supposedly had an impact on the Norwegian approach to 
CIMIC in the legacy of an egalitarian military structure. Ulriksen (2002:145) hints to this 
point, where the ability to make decisions on a low tactical level probably is well suited 
for Norwegian soldiers, and more so perhaps than soldiers from more rigid, hierarchical 
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cultures. To the Norwegian CIMIC teams working detached from the French contingent, 
this legacy could prove to be an advantage.  
 
When it comes to the peace tradition the Norwegian CIMIC officers may be perceived as 
carriers of that tradition, to the degree they have internalized its discourse. One 
consequence of the Norwegian peace tradition might be that local authorities and 
populations perceive the Norwegian CIMIC officers as coming from a “humanitarian 
peace nation,” to quote the Norwegian self-image. An opinion poll made in Europe in 
connection with the celebration of Norway’s 100 years of independence from Sweden 
shows that the Norwegian self-image is not reflected in other European countries’ 
associations of Norway.146 “Magnificent nature” scores 44 %, whilst “friendliness and 
openness” and “national wealth” succeeds with 8 %. The association “a nation with focus 
on humanitarian activity/operations” is made by 0 %. This poll was made in Europe, but it 
suggests that the common Afghan might not associate Norway with humanitarianism.  
  
Yet being carriers of the peace tradition with its focus on democracy and human rights is 
a decided advantage, as stressed by the humanitarian worker: “Norwegian CIMIC has 
many advantages, first and foremost because they come with a democratic awareness of 
people’s rights, and respect for human rights. This is a fundamental human rights 
perception I do not think you can find in so many other places.”147 
 
Motivations for participating in PSOs have proved to be mixed, perhaps with less focus 
on idealistic motives than anticipated. One of the CIMIC-officers I interviewed stated the 
following: “I suppose I have a spirit for adventure. I think it is very rewarding to be out 
with the armed forces, and I thought that perhaps this would be even more rewarding, as it 
involved more contact with the civilian population.”148 Many of the CIMIC-officers have 
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147 Interview 11 March, 2005 
148 Interview 9 May, 2005 
     
 105
a civilian education, and a mixed civilian and military background. The humanitarian 
worker sees the combination of human-, work-, and international experience as a decided 
advantage. Civilian competencies are advantageous in CIMIC work. “CIMIC recruits 
personnel whom are often idealistic in mentality or spirit”149 according to one officer. 
Maybe CIMIC personnel differ in motivation from recruits to other missions, in that 
idealism is an assertive factor. Still some officers also focused on CIMIC as a “niche-
capacity,” from which they could gain narrow and desired competencies. Yet, cultural 
awareness and a desire to be involved with the local population make for a good point of 
departure in executing CIMIC tasks.  
 
Mæland (ibid:49-50) illustrates how the focus on “doing a good job” combined with a 
preoccupation with the near, that being with the troops, overshadowed the distant strategy 
when deployed abroad. Distant strategy did not carry sufficient meaning to his 
interviewees, in their desire to do something meaningful when deployed abroad. 
Subsequently “To speak of Norwegian politicians or the international community’s 
intents appear irrefutably as a bit odd when patrolling on a dusty main road in Obilic or 
Kosovo Polje” (ibid). The CIMIC-officers in my interview material did not focus on 
strategic concerns when elaborating on the success of their mission. They seem to differ 
in the choice of indicators measuring success. On officer stated that: 
 
 “The CIMIC mission was very successful. It was very narrow, too narrow, and needs to be 
further developed. But we spent our money, and I disagree that it is wrong for men in green to 
use assistance means for humanitarian purposes. It is important for the military to support the 
civil society.”150  
 
Another officer stated that “I am uncertain whether it contributed to winning the hearts 
and minds of the Afghans. We did a lot of good work, and what we did we did very well, 
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but we did not do the right things. This was not CIMIC.”151  A third officer seem to agree 
in stating that “Successful, yes, when we received money, but it was far out in the project-
window, and it is dangerous to do that too often, as it sends a signal to politicians about a 
“feel-good” thing, where the military focus is lost.”152 This officer hints to the political-
strategic level, but warns against the temptation to use CIMIC as a foreign policy tool to 
such a degree that the military mission is being jeopardized. Success in terms of 
accomplishing strategic goals does not seem to be of the essence to the CIMIC officers. 
The feeling of success in accomplishment will arguably carry with it the feeling of having 
done something meaningful. Different focus and perceptions as to what CIMIC should 
entail might have created variations in the degree of meaning obtained and understandings 
of success. Yet CIMIC is perceived as a meaningful service, which is also emphasised in 
an article published on Forsvarsnett just after the return of CIMIC element one. The 
article was labelled “A meaningful service in Afghanistan” (Homo 2003), where an 
interviewed CIMIC-officer stressed the meaningfulness of the operation and the good 
feeling of accomplishment upon return.    
 
We have already seen how the Norwegian CIMIC teams were focused on relation-
building. Relation-building towards the local population and authorities are intrinsically 
linked to consent.  
 
When it comes to the use of force CIMIC as a combat service support function did not 
often encounter situations where the use of force proved necessary. The most serious 
episode happened on 13 May, 2003, when two Norwegian CIMIC officers were shot at 
whilst guarding a house holding a meeting in a village in the district Mir Bacha Kot. One 
of the officers barely survived. A newspaper correspondent (Andreassen 2004) have 
investigated the episode and points to deficient security routines. According to the 
correspondent the area in which the Norwegian CIMIC teams operated had not been 
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subject to security and intelligence deliberations, the Norwegian CIMIC officers felt safe 
in an area which proved to have a Taliban presence, the cooperation between the 
Norwegian CIMIC teams and the French who was suppose to provide protection did not 
work very well, and the two officers felt so secure that they chose not to wear their body 
armour. The episode shows that it may have been hard to assess the threat-situation in the 
areas where small and relatively unprotected Norwegian CIMIC teams operated. CIMIC 
training in Norway prior to deployment to Afghanistan was changed after the episode, 
with more focus on securing of one’s own (Skjæret 2003). In the operational theatre on 
the other hand, one CIMIC-officer claimed that:  
 
“I believe that the security regulations for Norwegian CIMIC were the same before and after the 
incident, even though our reading and execution of these became more pointedly. The incident 
came as a bit of a surprise. But, we went through and demanded threat-assessments on our area. 
A National Intelligence unit was seconded to the Norwegian commando in Operation Enduring 
Freedom, but this national resource was not prioritized for Norwegian CIMIC in ISAF. The shots 
and wounds on the 13th of May did not echo into any political or operational consequence at the 
national level. ”153  
 
Another CIMIC-officer on the other hand stated that “I believe we had a much higher 
level of security than the first element, and as far as I understood the third element had a 
higher level than us again.”154 Thomassen (2003) claimed that the security regulations for 
French CIMIC teams were made more stringent after the incident, whilst the Norwegian 
teams operated as they had done before the episode. According to the article the French 
CIMIC teams were now protected by trained personnel and armoured vehicles when 
travelling in the field, whilst the Norwegian teams doing just about the same job had to do 
without that kind of protection. According to the embassy diplomat “The gunman was a 
previous Taliban, now dismissed; he claimed he heard a voice in his head, he did not 
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shoot because the military was building a school…”155 The focus on relation-building and 
consent rather than force protection measures seem to be a feature of this episode.  
  
According to the officers there were differences between the camps in regard to security 
regulations. Differences would occur if one camp tightened up, and later another. Single 
episodes such as the one mentioned above, as well as operations in tense areas could lead 
to adjustments. National contingents were also free to make the ISAF regulations more 
stringent. According to one officer “It could be different policies on this. We followed the 
ISAF regulations. The other CIMIC units also did that. So, faced by the same threat 
picture, we would act alike.”156 
 
According to one interviewee in the NUPI database on KFOR:  
 
 “There are different flavours to how the brigades do things…This is a result of their military 
tradition, their history and their training. So, based on this, the nations will go after or back down 
from trouble… So, it is possible to change the flavour. But if you want to do that, you should not 
lecture the other, but allow them to do their things next to you and let them watch you do 
things…So what we want is to watch what others do, and take the best from them.” 
 
The different flavours were also apparent in the CIMIC work in Afghanistan. One CIMIC 
officer points to the differences between the Norwegian and German approaches: “The 
Norwegian approach is informal, works hard to develop relations, perceived by others as 
not very military in its substance. The Germans are formalistic, bureaucratic, and rigid, 
that is they have a different military culture.”157 He continues to state that the Norwegian 
approach was more similar to that of the Nordic countries, and next to that of the West-
European countries. The Americans operated with other proportions, and lacked analysis 
of local conditions. The disadvantage of different flavours is stressed by an officer: 
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“There are no advantages at all, when you are joining an operation, as long as it is not 
national, you have a chief, and if the way of solving the mission is divergent, then it won’t 
succeed.”158 The military-cultural equalities with the British were emphasised by some of 
the officers. Mæland (2004:56) also points to this, stating that the British are considered 
as very professional, calm and determined, and that the Norwegians are feeling related to 
the British perhaps due to cultural concurrence. 
 
The role perception as “humanitarian military” should arguably be easily applicable to 
CIMIC, due to the nature of the mission. We have previously seen that the humanitarian 
actors very much dislike the mixture of humanitarian and military “spaces”. One CIMIC-
officer stresses that this blurring of lines is not appreciated by the military component 
either.159 This implies a wish for clear dividing lines, roles and mandates on both parts. 
Bi-SC 86-3 (article 6c) states that “CIMIC implies neither military control of civilian 
organisations or agencies nor the reverse.” A confusing label as “humanitarian military” 
may not necessarily be desirable. Mæland intends to build a bridge between 
“humanitarian” and “military” in order to create a professional self-image and identity 
absorbing the search for meaning. Whether the two role-perceptions are compatible in 
their characteristics is highly questionable, and I do not believe it to be the case. Neither 
do I believe it to be desirable, as the two, despite increased blurring, are performing 
different tasks in accordance with different mandates. This is not to say that military 
personnel may not be humanitarian, only that the label “humanitarian” ought to be 
reserved for humanitarian actors working in the humanitarian space.    
 
Seemingly the Norwegian political culture and military organizational culture produces a 
certain approach to CIMIC. This approach is in line with the “liberal approach” to 
CIMIC, where available funding from humanitarian budgets allows for humanitarian 
activism, and the focus on physical force protection measures are downscaled.  
                                                 
158 Interview 6 April, 2005 
159 Interview 13 May, 2005 
     
 110
 
6.2.2 The intervening impact of social learning 
 
Social learning is measured by discussing previous experiences with CIMIC, attendance 
to international training courses and social interaction with other contingencies during 
deployment. 
 
All the CIMIC-officers I interviewed had at least participated in one peace support 
operation prior to Afghanistan, and they also had experience from CIMIC-work, though 
perhaps with other labels but arguably performing similar functions. The officers agreed 
that Norwegian CIMIC had “learned” from previous experiences in PSOs and 
international military operations, but as one officer stressed “… it was first as we arrived 
in Afghanistan that we have been doing CIMIC on a greater scale.”160 All the CIMIC 
officers had also attended, and some even served as instructors on, CIMIC courses 
abroad. One CIMIC officer stated that CIMIC-courses are highly prioritized.161 Courses 
are arranged by HQ CGN in the Dutch city of Budel, with participants from several 
nations, in addition to NORCAPS162 courses and courses arranged by the Finnish due to 
their command of ISAF J9. CIMIC element three participated on the field practice Nordic 
Peace in Finland before deployment to Afghanistan. Hence they had practical experience 
in addition to courses in the Netherlands and Denmark.  
   
Apparently the Norwegian CIMIC personnel serving in Afghanistan had more CIMIC 
experience and training than the Norwegian officers performing CIMIC tasks in Kosovo. 
In section 4.6 I described how Nissen (2002:73) emphasised the inadequate training and 
lack of extensive CIMIC experience with Norwegian officers serving in Kosovo. The 
reasons are probably the Norwegian participation in CGN and the consequent 
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establishment of the readiness-list, where devoted and experienced personnel could apply, 
and the doctrinal development within NATO attempting to sort out the conceptual 
confusion. CIMIC is in a process of development, which the Norwegian CIMIC-
deployment to Afghanistan has taken one step further.    
 
“We learn from everybody else” stated on CIMIC-officer, and continued “we have an 
idea that we are ourselves pretty good at CIMIC, and learn from both our own mistakes 
and the mistakes of others. We have a large circle of acquaintances; we see were it fails, 
we are our own masters of teaching, but learn from others mistakes.”163 The military-
cultural legacy from the British has been mentioned before. The officer suggests that with 
CIMIC the British are perhaps more influenced by the Norwegians than the other way 
around.  
 
The importance of socialisation is emphasised by one CIMIC-officer stating that 
“Socialisation with other nations is intrinsic to CIMIC.”164 The relationship with the 
French contingent seems to be an exception. This may be due to differences in language 
and military culture. According to Leerand (2003) the Norwegians arranged an open 
house for Norwegians and colleagues from other nations every Thursday in Camp 
Fredheim. This was considered a valuable arena for exchanging news and played an 
important social function according to the Colonel Lieutenant Joar Fjellstad.  
 
Due to the substantial participation on courses and field-exercises abroad, and previous 
experiences from CIMIC related activities, I think it is reasonable to suggest that the 
CIMIC-officers have been subject to “social learning,” which again influences their 
military organizational culture. The relational aspects with the concept of CIMIC 
stimulates “social learning,” and adds credit to the suggestion that the CIMIC-officers 
have been influenced throughout their experiences, training, coursing and social relations.  
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Part 5 Conclusion 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it” claimed Dag 
Hammerskjøld, the former UN Secretary General (1953) as the UN was embarking on its 
first generation of peacekeeping. Today peacekeeping has become an integral part of the 
military profession. The realization has moved closer to the statement given by Lieutenant 
Colonel P. E. Korström, that “Peacekeeping is a job for soldiers, but soldiers alone can 
not do it.” The conceptions of peacekeeping and civil-military cooperation have changed 
fundamentally since the end of the Cold War, and a consolidation is not likely to occur in 
the foreseeable future. Within the different nation militaries diverse interpretations of 
CIMIC exists. CIMIC contributes to the enhancement of mutual understandings between 
military and civilian components, and are an essential tool faced with a third and possibly 
a fourth generation of peacekeeping. In this thesis I have sought to explain the Norwegian 
decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan, and the consequent approach of 
Norwegian CIMIC to the mission. I developed four hypotheses set up in a competitive 
design, two for each part of the research question. The purpose of the thesis has been both 
theoretical and empirical. Theoretically I intended to investigate how two substantive 
theories based on a supposedly incompatible meta-theoretical foundation would be able to 
explain a case from the military domain. Empirically the purpose was to investigate 
CIMIC as a concept and study which indicators explain on the decision to contribute with 
a CIMIC unit, and the consequent approach to the mission.   
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7.2 The main findings of the analysis 
7.2.1 Empirical findings 
 
In the introduction chapter I forwarded the following research question: 
 
"What explains the Norwegian decision to contribute with a civil-military cooperation 
unit to the peace support operation in Afghanistan, and consequently what explains the 
Norwegian approach to civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan?" 
 
When analyzing the first part of the research question I established that identified 
Norwegian security-policy interests and military strategic objectives played an important 
part in the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit. The security-policy interests of 
securing continued NATO relevance and developing a relevant niche-capacity were 
significant to the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit. Despite the fact that these 
interests were not to a great degree emphasised by the interviewees they are clearly stated 
in official documents. The military strategic goals of continued participation in CGN, 
cost-effectiveness and testing CIMIC as a concept were stressed by several informants. 
Gaining experience and developing a Norwegian CIMIC policy was not emphasised in 
the same manner. Yet acquiring valuable experience and expertise is a stated aim for 
Norwegian participation in international military operations, and the development of a 
Norwegian CIMIC-policy will probably be spurred by the CIMIC experience in 
Afghanistan notwithstanding a conscious or stated intention of such a development. The 
culturalist hypothesis suggested that the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to 
Afghanistan was a Norwegian interest defined by Norwegian political and military 
organizational culture. The analysis shows that the Norwegian humanitarian and peace-
tradition vocabulary and self-image fit the CIMIC contribution well. CIMIC also seem to 
be in line with what might turn out to be a new defence-tradition, where international 
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deployment is incorporated into military professionalism but, as of yet, preferably with a 
soft, peacekeeping mandate.  
 
When analysing how national security-interests were apparent in the Norwegian approach 
to CIMIC in Afghanistan, I focused on visibility and doctrinal observance. CIMIC was a 
visible contribution, particularly by the means of projects and the consequent “flagging” 
of these projects. The visibility-effect was increased by national financing, making it 
possible to concentrate the efforts in the Norwegian area of responsibility. The Norwegian 
CIMIC elements were engaged in all three CIMIC core activities, namely civil-military 
liaison, support to the civil environment and support to the force. Yet the support to the 
civil environment function seems to have been in focus, perhaps at the expense of the 
other core activities. The project-oriented approach embraced to fulfil this function was 
not perceived to be in line with NATO CIMIC doctrine. The degree to which the CIMIC 
elements operated on the “sideline” of the French contingency in Afghanistan was also 
perceived as a decided disadvantage. One MFA informant suggests that “CIMIC should 
be integrated into the force rather than a unit of 20 men. This was an experiment, and it 
was not successful, not optimal.”165 The MoD official would not perceive CIMIC in 
Afghanistan as an experiment, but adds that in the case of a new CIMIC deployment it 
would be suitable to attach it to a greater Norwegian contribution.166 The Aftenposten 
correspondent Andreassen writes in an article about the shooting-episode in May 2003 
that: 
 
“They [the CIMIC officers interviewed] would rather see Norway contributing with a greater 
number of soldiers at the same time so that they to a certain degree can look after themselves, and 
gain a certain weight in respect to the contingencies of other countries. – Operating with small 
units in a limited period of time will mainly be simple “flagging”, says one officer. – It is too 
cheap and lacks continuity. Traditionally Norway has contributed with a relatively great 
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contingency over a longer period of time. It is about time that we do the same thing in 
Afghanistan…” (Andreassen 2004, my translation) 
 
Sølvberg (2004) also emphasises the previous tendency of contributing with larger and 
more static force-contributions to e.g. Lebanon and the Balkans, whilst the efforts in 
Afghanistan has been characterized by a greater span in the contributions, where one 
force-contribution is deployed for a shorter period of time to be replaced by other 
contributions. In conclusion the visibility of CIMIC in terms of promoting Norwegian 
security-policy interests seems to have been achieved. On the other hand, the Norwegian 
approach to CIMIC to a certain degree does not seem to have been “militarily rational” in 
terms of doctrinal observance. The doctrinal deviations lead some CIMIC-officers to 
perceive of the mission as “not-CIMIC”. Perhaps different conclusions must be drawn 
depending on where you stand. From a political point of view the Norwegian approach to 
the CIMIC mission was successful. From a military point of view the following question 
must be posed: Did the Norwegian CIMIC teams support the military mission? Some of 
my CIMIC informants found this to be the case. Others perceived CIMIC as it had 
emerged in Afghanistan as too far out in the “project window”, with the subsequent 
danger of “mission creep.”167 
 
The culturalist hypothesis suggested that the Norwegian approach to CIMIC in 
Afghanistan was a product of the Norwegian political and military organizational cultures 
and the impact of social learning. The analysis shows that the Norwegian political and 
military organizational cultures produce a certain approach to CIMIC, in line with a 
“liberal approach” to CIMIC.   
 
 
                                                 
167 Daniel and Hayes (in Pugh 1997:9) define mission creep as: ”Mission creep occurs when there is an incremental 
increase in the tasks assigned UN forces to the point that the tasks far exceed initial expectations of what the forces 
had planned for and were equipped to achieve” 
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7.2.2 Theoretical findings 
 
Fearon and Wendt (in Carlsnaes et al. 2002:52) ask the question whether progress in IR is 
best served by perceiving the field as a battle of analytical paradigms. They claim that 
despite the existence of substantial differences, the meta-theoretical foundations also 
share substantial similarities. Further on they claim that “…where genuine differences 
exists they are as often complementarities as contradictions” (ibid.). Jepperson et al. (in 
Katzenstein (ed.) 1996) seem to agree in arguing that “The discussion of the various 
possible relationships between differing lines of argument seems impaired by the highly 
reified “paradigm-talk”…” Fearon and Wendt (in Carlsnaes et al. 2002:53) argue that 
rationalism and constructivism are most fruitfully viewed as “…analytical tools or lenses 
with which to theorize about world politics.” Pragmatically treating rationalism and 
constructivism as analytical tools does not oblige the researcher to make ontological or 
empirical commitments (ibid).  
 
I set up a competitive theoretical design for this thesis, in order to test the theories against 
each other as well as against the evidence. I argued that my case was a “hard case”, well-
suited to test a cultural theory. As previously seen Desch argues that what constitutes a 
“hard case” is not issue-area, but whether the competing theories make different 
predictions about its outcome. The first part of my research question was perhaps not a 
“critical case” in this respect, as both the rationalist and the culturalist hypotheses support 
the decision to contribute with a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan. Hence, none of the theories 
supplant the other; they are more likely to supplement each other, each explaining one 
part of the puzzle. Arguably, though, it seems that culturalism has less causal impact than 
rationalism in the first part of the research question. The rationalist variables are more 
compelling. When it comes to the second part of the research question the two theories 
may predict different approaches. The culturalist theory would predict a “liberal 
approach” to CIMIC, in line with indicators of the Norwegian political culture and 
military organizational culture. The rationalist theory would rather predict a flexible 
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approach, were support to the military mission gained more attention and projects less. At 
the same time the “flexible approach” would allow for a “militarily rational” approach in 
terms of execution of the core CIMIC functions. When analyzing this part of the research 
question it appeared that rational, political-strategic goals were accomplished by the 
Norwegian approach to CIMIC, but this was not necessarily in compliance a rational 
military approach. Accordingly, the political-strategic part of the rationalist hypothesis 
would also predict a “liberal approach” to CIMIC. Again it is reasonable to suggest that 
the rational variables have more explanatory power than the culturalist variables. But the 
relationship between the theories may not be characterized it not necessarily competitive, 
to use the label of Jupille et al. (2002: 14). Rather it would seem that the relationship 
between the rationalist and the culturalist theories have been additive or sequential, where 
“…the whole presents some gains over partial representations, all while preserving the 
integrity of the contributions of the parts” (ibid).  
 
7.3 Possible future prospects for CIMIC 
 
In this section I will first briefly present a desired future execution of CIMIC as proposed 
by a CIMIC officer. Then I will present three potential future prospects, which are not 
mutually exclusive, but all hinting to possible developments linked to present trends. 
These prospects are tied to the future of foreign aid, privatization of security and the 
concept of integrated missions.  
 
The CIMIC officer lists three objectives he considers intrinsic to the future execution of 
CIMIC.168 Firstly, CIMIC must be integrated from the planning-phase of an operation. 
Evidently, CIMIC as a “sideline” activity is not perceived as the best way to support the 
military mission. Additionally it is vital to include CIMIC from the early planning-phases, 
in order to gain military efficiency and possibly facilitate reaching the end-state faster. 
                                                 
168 Interview 6 April, 2005 
     
 118
Secondly, financial resources must be at the disposal of the force commander. Rollins 
(2001: 127-128) agrees with this line of thinking, claiming that “NATO has mechanisms 
to fund CIMIC activities at theatre level. If more national funds could be channelled 
through these mechanisms, rather than through national military contributions, theatre-
level coordination might become easier.” Yet there are obstacles to this accomplishment 
as discussed in my analysis. One obstacle carrying a heavy load is the fact that states may 
be unwilling to sponsor the CIMIC activities of other national contingencies, which 
consequently earn the possible “good-will effect” of CIMIC activities. By gaining a 
broader vision and perspective the realization may win through that CIMIC should be 
executed in support of the mission, not in support of a particular contingency and hence 
funding at the disposal of the force commander may be the best way to avoid distortions 
within the area of operations and spread the resources in a best possible manner. The third 
objective is related to the second, namely that CIMIC must not support national agendas. I 
will not claim that this is an accomplishable objective, but developments may reduce the 
impact of national agendas. Doctrinal observance may lead to greater transparency and 
coordination. A gradual definitional agreement on CIMIC and consequently more similar 
approaches might decrease the impact of national agendas. Yet, the Armed Forces are a 
foreign policy instrument, and to isolate a force contribution from the greater political and 
national agenda is inconceivable.  
 
7.3.1 The future of foreign aid 
 
Todd Sandler (1998) has written an article on global and regional public goods, in which 
he makes some comments on the future of foreign aid possibly relevant to CIMIC. 
Sandler claims that the income gap between the very richest nations and the very poorest 
nations will increase. This gap underlies Sandlers prediction about the future of foreign 
aid. As the world is faced with pending environmental, health and security challenges, the 
very richest nations will be the nations to avoid future environmental disasters, to cure 
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diseases, to monitor the planet and to disarm rogue nations. Sandler (ibid:236) suggests 
that the efforts made by the richest nations to prevent instability in places such as Bosnia 
and Kuwait to spread is an example of how the public good of stability maintenance is 
being provided by the richest nations. In regime theory, the “public good” problem 
represent an enforcement problem as illustrated with the “prisoners’ dilemma”. The 
“public good” problem is when actors can not be excluded from the consumption of a 
good, and consequently tends to “free-ride” so the good is undersupplied (Fehl 2004:363). 
Sandler suggests that in the future, traditional forms of foreign aid may be replaced by the 
rich countries providing such public goods as stability. Hence “Tomorrow’s foreign aid” 
may be “free-rider aid””, that e.g. eliminates threats to world peace (ibid:223). Further on 
this anticipated change in foreign aid will circumvent what Sandler identifies as foreign 
aid fatigue with the rich countries and the reluctance of countries to give aid enriching 
corrupt regimes. Simultaneously the voters of rich countries will accept this free-rider 
foreign aid, as the voters benefit from the public goods provided. In sum the argument is 
that free-rider aid, in terms of provision of public goods, is apt to supersede traditional 
forms of giving. From a CIMIC point of view the proposal implies that CIMIC will be an 
incorporated part of a new foreign aid regime providing the public good of stabilization. 
In this respect MFA funding would be unproblematic, an extended security concept 
would be activated and the dividing-lines between political, humanitarian and military 
contributions would be increasingly blurred mixed in a superior “free rider foreign aid” 
perspective.      
 
7.3.2 Privatization of security 
 
The role of business in the world of security, commonly referred to as “privatization of 
security”, is according to Bailes “….wide and varied, just as it has been at every stage of 
human history.”169 Bailes identifies three generic types of interaction between business 
                                                 
169 ”Business and security – in search of a holistic view”, speaking notes for Alyson J. K. Bailes, Director, SIPRI 
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Oslo, 3 March 2005 
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and security, the first being “The delegation or transfer of traditional security activities by 
state actors to non-state ones.” She further claims that today a growing number of strong 
states are engaging private security companies for a variety of functions, typically to be 
able to focus its military capacities increasingly on rapid-reaction interventions overseas 
without major defence budget increase. The logic is to cut down on surplus personnel and 
expenses allowing military personnel to concentrate on “hard core” combat duties where 
they can be inserted into a situation and withdrawn again as rapidly as possible. Bailes 
suggests that the U.S., the U.K. and France are the best examples of this trend, whilst in 
the Nordic region Denmark and Finland are starting to consider some degree of 
privatization of support services. Subsequently she lists a number of services in the 
defence cycle which may subject to privatization, such as routine services that do not 
require special military skills, services that do not have to be provided in the front line, 
non-combat services in the front line, military-type services to supplement regular 
personnel such as guards and intelligence collection, and post-combat service. Bailes 
emphasised that “The privatization of “post-combat” functions is a particularly marked 
trend at present as countries on the one hand understand the need for lengthy 
reconstruction but on the other grow more wary of tying down and over-committing their 
forces” (ibid.). Rana also discuss this privatization-trend, claiming that “Key states, armed 
forces and possibly humanitarian actors will push for even greater use of civilian 
contractors to carry out humanitarian and reconstruction activities, thus outsourcing risks, 
roles and responsibilities” (2004:580). CIMIC as a combat support function must be 
considered placed in the target-group of security privatization. We might see a 
development where some states focus on CIMIC as a niche capacity, whilst other nations 
choose to outsource this function to be able to concentrate on other capacities. The 
Norwegian direction is hard to suggest, but as of today CIMIC is firmly placed and 
conceptually explored within the ranks of the Armed Forces.  
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7.3.3 Integrated missions 
 
The transition from the first generation peacekeeping to the complex, multifunctional 
operations of the post-Cold War era spurred the development of the concept “integrated 
missions”. An independent UN study, “Report on Integrated Missions,” directs attention 
to the lack of a strategic, coordinated and sustained international effort in peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding efforts. The report points to an improvement in performance, but adds 
that “…the success rate in long-term stabilisation is still too low, and many countries 
relapse into conflict after an initial period of stabilisation” (Eide et al. 2005: 3). The UN 
seeks to help countries is the transition from war to lasting peace by means of an 
“integrated mission” instrument. The general assumption is that integration is the way of 
the future, but still the concept lacks a unified definition and a number of divergent 
practices have emerged (ibid.). The report defines “integrated mission” as:  
 
“…an instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting 
peace, or address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through 
subsuming various actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management 
framework” (ibid: 14).  
 
The concept of integrated missions might also be transferred to the level of national 
contributions to “complex situations”, and to the civil-military relationship. As previously 
mentioned Greve and Hertzeberg (2001:21) were not able to establish a Norwegian 
vision, intention, policy or goal for civil-military cooperation in a PSO, in other words, 
the political agenda seemed to be missing. I have showed that in terms of profiling, 
“flagging” and visibility the Norwegian CIMIC elements have served a political purpose. 
Yet I have not established a political agenda when it comes to integrating Norwegian 
military and civil efforts in Afghanistan as a means to achieve political synergies and 
increased efficiency. One CIMIC officer suggests that “The MFA is dreaming of 
Norwegian military forces and Norwegian NGOs working together in the same area, 
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providing a dual Norwegian effect, but the NGOs are not very interested in such a 
scenario.”170 Considering that both CIMIC and NGOs are being funded by the MFA and 
the expected synergy-effects of such integration, this is not an unwarranted suggestion. 
Integration may be the way of the future, but one of the largest obstacles in the way of it 
is scepticism on the part of the humanitarian sector. A key concern is the possible 
infringement of humanitarian principles such as humanity, independence and neutrality 
that could follow from integration (Eide et al. 2005:13-14). Rana (2004:580) makes the 
following remarks: 
 
 “…there is a risk that the gap between policy and practice will grow. Some humanitarian actors 
will, with difficulty, resist political and financial pressures to integrate into broader efforts. 
Others will simply accept that they are not neutral or independent, and adapt their modus 
operandi to the realities of the situation. Collective and constructive dialogue on the civil-military 
relationship might become difficult for a community of humanitarian agencies with divergent 
mandates.” 
 
Rana (ibid: 578) also identifies some positive aspects to integration, e.g. civilians might 
promote greater cultural sensitivity, lobby for greater awareness of the effects of conflict 
on civilian populations and provide technical and political advice. Evidently, integration 
of military, political and humanitarian efforts will not see the light of day in some time to 
come. But still, the UN study report testifies to increased attention and acknowledgement, 
and perhaps integration will sneak in the backdoor by incremental steps.  
 
7.4 Further research  
 
A number of potential studies emerge from this thesis. It could be interesting to study 
CIMIC approaches in a comparative light, preferably a “liberal approach” to CIMIC with 
flexible or conservative approaches. It could also be interesting to view the Norwegian 
                                                 
170 Interview 23 August, 2005 
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approach from an outsiders’ perspective, and to study what states choosing another 
approach than the Norwegian thinks of the Norwegian approach. Further inquiries into the 
concept of CIMIC are important. A goal must be to acquire international consensus on the 
meaning of CIMIC to reduce misinterpretations and facilitate similar responses, and to 
achieve this theoretical and empirical studies will be called upon. The civil-military 
relations have been much studied from a humanitarian point of view, but not so much 
from a military point of view. The effect of support to the force measures would be an 
interesting study, requiring field-studies to an operational theatre to measure the actual 
“winning hearts and minds” effect in the affected local population. The study of possible 
effects of force contributions could also be interesting. Does Norway achieve access to 
important decision-making channels by participating in international military operations? 
Does it make any difference if the contribution is “soft” or “hard”? Does Norway 
camouflage a preference for “hard” force contributions at the end of the day? The 
potential CIMIC prospects also opens for some interesting topics. Research on Norwegian 
military organizational culture would be very interesting, asking e.g. what does it take to 
change a military organizational culture? It could seem that my thesis is left with many 
doors unopened, and I believe this to be inevitable as I have investigated a complex, 
comprehensive and continuously evolving concept.    
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9. Appendix 
 
9.2 Appendix 1: Interview guide 
 
Norsk CIMIC generelt: 
- Har du tidligere erfaring med CIMIC? 
- Hvorfor bidrar Norge med CIMIC elementer til Afghanistan etter din oppfatning? 
- Hvilke retningslinjer/doktriner baserer norsk CIMIC seg på? 
- Hva slags trening fikk du på forhånd? 
CIMIC i Afghanistan: 
- Når var du i Afghanistan? 
- Hvilke andre nasjoner bidro med CIMIC elementer i din periode? 
- Hvor mye tid brukes på de forskjellige kjernefunksjonene til CIMIC? 
- Hvordan kunne en ”normal” dag forløpe seg? 
- Hvilke prosjekter arbeidet CIMIC med når du var i Afghanistan? 
- Hvordan foregikk liasoneringen med lokale myndigheter i Afghanistan? NGOer? 
- Opplevde du at CIMIC enheter fra ulike nasjonale kontingenter hadde ulik tilnærming til 
oppdraget? Ble mandatet tolket ulikt? 
- Slapp nasjonale agendaer til i CIMIC? 
- Hadde ulike nasjonale CIMIC forskjellig tilnærming til force protection? 
- På hvilken måte skilte den norske tilnærmingen seg eventuelt fra andre tilnærminger?  
- Er den norske tilnærmingen til CIMIC mer lik noen nasjoner enn andre? 
- Vektlegger noen nasjoner betydningen av CIMIC mer enn andre? Hva med Norge? 
- Hva er fordelene med ulike nasjonale tilnærminger til CIMIC? Hva er ulempene? 
- Har norsk tilnærming til CIMIC ”lært” fra tidligere erfaringer i fredsstøttende operasjoner? 
- Har norsk CIMIC ”lært” fra andre nasjonale tilnærminger? Hvem er våre ”læremestere”? 
- Hvordan oppleves koordineringen av CIMIC? 
- Hva synes du om finansieringen av CIMIC?  
- Forholdt CIMIC seg til UD, FD eller begge? 
- Er CIMIC ”akseptert” av de mer tradisjonelle bransjene? 
- Vil du beskrive CIMIC oppdraget som vellykket? 
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9.2 Appendix 2: Map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/graphics/e040628a.jpg 
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